Intel Honesty

Some of the issues are way downstream of those NIMBYs:

Non-housing costs are quite low in Taiwan. Food and childcare, in particular, are so much cheaper than California that it’s hard to believe.

But the NIMBYs aren’t totally in the clear. Rental housing with 3+ bedrooms (for families) is severely lacking in much of the US. Maybe fire codes are to blame. Taiwan is full of very nice new high-rise development that contains units with lots of bedrooms. Wandering around those developments and the new 3-story developments in California, the ones in Taiwan are much, much, much nicer, even from the outside. The NIMBYs should take note.

The thing that makes America a corporate-dominated oligarchy is veto rights. The American middle class has enough political power to get issues on the table but not to overcome an anonymous rich person saying "no". NIMBYism is the same underlying power - vetocracy. So corporations would have to spend way more time fighting their own power to get things done.

The federalized nature of American government means both things can be true simultaneously, even though they seem paradoxical when placed together in juxtaposition. The Feds have supremacy in certain matters, but not all.

Moreover, lobbying is more a question of connections and relationships which are lubricated with money than pure spending power, so it can be easier for a large corporation to nudge things its way at the national and state levels while still struggling to curry influence at the local level, and vice versa for small companies.

trillion-dollar industries at the forefront of the global economy constantly getting their shit rocked by a few dozen NIMBY retirees at city council meetings

A lot of Intel R&D (and all their manufacturing) is outside the Bay Area, i.e., Oregon and elsewhere, so not sure this is a factor in their case.

We detached this subthread from https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=41448341.

I'm not saying you are wrong but personally I'd view the stock as an attractive perk right now since it is so low.

Whereas if I were joining a company such as Nvidia I'd honestly be kind of worried.

Historical performance isn't really a great indicator here.

It's grim at INTC but don't forget the CHIPS act and whatever else will follow that. The US government spends 0.5T per month - more than the market cap of all but the top 15 American companies [0] [1]

Not saying it's a good or bad idea, or that it will or won't happen - but if the US government decides to reinvent Intel, they can easily write a cheque that (if spent wisely) might do the trick.

[0] https://companiesmarketcap.com/usa/largest-companies-in-the-...

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_federal_budget

I worked there for a few years a little over a decade ago in Oregon. The wages were abysmal, so you're not wrong, but they still drew a lot of good talent because Intel was more accessible to the suburbs than the city of Portland (commuting to downtown Portland was awful) and remote options were limited. Krzanich era layoffs and the availability of more remote work options resulted in a rapid drain of talent though.

The working environment was toxic (still is based on what I've heard from folks I know working there). It encouraged working against your peers instead of with them. Top heavy management meant lots of poor choices and money burned on worthless projects that never saw the light of day. Always had the looming threat of layoffs which ate into morale. TONS of off-shoring and third-party contracts, which everyone here knows is a mess in itself. Piss-poor research before buying up smaller companies or doing joint-ventures. Pouring money into the construction of more buildings when so many of their current ones sit unoccupied. It's all just a recipe for immense failure.

I think if Intel was a private company then it would have a better chance of recovery via a collection of focused experiments to overcome their biggest technical deficiencies (compared to their competitors) or to, e.g., figure out a compelling new product that the market didn't realise it needed, but that doesn't require solving difficult physics problems.

But to do this sort of thing you need a dictator at the top who is willing to risk a run of negative-profit quarters to fix the company's underlying rot. If you try to do anything like that as a leader of a public company, then shareholders tend to get angry.

I wonder if there's any lesson that could be distilled from the (minority of?) public companies that don't end up settling into a pattern of carefully-managed mediocrity. Is there a unifying theme? I haven't spent enough time thinking about this to even propose an answer other than "cult of personality around the leader" as maybe helping.

If AAPL bought Intel could it fix it?

Do you work in the Taiwan side of the industry?

I worked for Intel in the 90s.

I think the company always paid "industry standard" compared to other companies paying actually well. And it was a terrible place to work by most objective measures - people got let go quite freely, etc. When Andy Grove writes a book called "Only The Paranoid Survive", he's not committing to employee loyalty.

I think the way Intel got good people, and they did get good people, was by a combination of the opportunity to build something that gets widely used and a cult-like spirit of "are you good and tough enough to survive the bullshit".

But yeah, seems there's no recovery when that approach stops working. And it's disturbing that many of America's "crown jewels" (Intel, Boeing, etc) are basically constructed that way.

I think this contains mostly correct analysis with respect to hiring experienced talent, but under emphasizes how unique each process is per company. Experience is a positive, but less positive because of it.

There is a lot of potential that could be made from newer hires combined with focused in house training/experimentation - which is what all these businesses had to do in their initial expansion - with not enough people of experience at scale available, and they probably had to do a running training ramp up multiple times over multiple generations of growth. This is in general is an underutilized strategy - esp for mature companies that need to essentially build a new generation of tech in-house.

They sidelined lip bu tan who was one of the advocates for even more layoffs and wage freezes but he’s one of many backwards thinkers they need to remove.

Genuine question: why isn’t what they need large layoffs and dramatic wage increases?

Intel's debt is not bad at all. My reading has it at $53 billion. Before their revenue collapsed in the last few years that debt is only about 50% of revenue. High but manageable compared to att or warner discovery who actually have unmanageable debt. Intel's problem is that revenue is decreasing, and quickly.

Throughout most of the 2010s, EUV lithography was like the "year of the Linux desktop" - i.e., this year will be the year where EUV was suitable for high volume manufacturing.

We need to learn to recognize the difference between something that's never going to happen for either physical or economic/social/structural reasons, and something that is just really difficult and takes a long time.

I always think of this when I think about fusion and the irritating "fusion is 20 years away and always will be" meme. In reality fusion has been edging closer, and closer, and closer for decades. Like EUV lithography it's just incredibly hard and requires a ton of capital and time and some of the smartest people on Earth to make it a reality. The same logic applies to things like a working HIV vaccine, life extension, or human space flight and space settlement.

The reason there's never been a year of the Linux desktop on the other hand has to do with the full picture of what's required to mass market a desktop OS and support that, not just the technical problems, as well as business reasons around what Microsoft does to incentivize vendors to stay in their ecosystem. Linux desktops are just about ready today but no mainstream laptop/desktop PC vendor is going to sell them for a long laundry-list of non-technical or para-technical (legacy software base) reasons.

year of the Linux desktop

A tangent, and I realise this phrase is a meme, but it has always bothered me. Nobody has ever defined what year of the Linux desktop actually means, so it's a phrase without any real meaning.

So did the year of the EUV lithography happen? What year was it?

(Genuinely asking, I don't know anything about chips - I'm the kind of programmer who is profoundly comforted by pretending like my CPU is like a really fast version of the thing I did in CompE 201, as opposed to reality which i gather is a bit more like a demonically possessed stone that glues together a bunch of barely understood physics that kind of "even out" at macro levels but seem pretty f'd up at quantum levels).

In addition, SMIC in China managed to get to 7 nm without the use of EUV. Also early EUV yields were actually quite low.

Nobody used EUV for 10 nm though. Even 7 nm doesn't need EUV. This kind of error calls the rest into question.

Intel was also being at least a bit disingenuous in public at the time although they probably also thought they could make those frequencies work. But a very senior Intel exec told me, at the time IBM was showering them with a lot of public snark, that of course they new about the upcoming issues but Microsoft was so worried about multicore scalability that Intel had to play along.

I remember seeing headlines every 18 months or so that Intel was laying off 10,000 engineers for no good reason. Made me think I didn’t want to go to work for them because I might be next.

a market dominated by industry giants from the 60s

The thing is, the SpaceX moment occurred because of a rare opportunity where the industry incumbents were insulated from any competition or need for innovation for ~30 years. Some domestic industries still operate in an environment somewhat like this (e.g. the steel industry), but still face modernized global competition (albeit whose effects are kept at bay via import tariffs reaching as high as 266%).

The semiconductor industry... while there are magnificent barriers to entry and not "enough" competition, they have absolutely not been wholly insulated from innovation or competition. And innovation in fabrication is driven at a very rapid pace! So there aren't huge outsized profits to be found like there was for SpaceX. And even SpaceX needed to invent what was almost an entirely new industry (Starlink) to become truly profitable.

And even trying to pull a "SpaceX" on domestic steel manufacturing would fall flat because you wouldn't capture the global market, and would still be dependent on some (potentially much lower) tariffs to compete against the very modernized factories in China, which are innovative/competitive/efficient, unlike our domestic industry.

SpaceX took advantage of a very rare situation where there truly was no competition or innovation anywhere on the planet for a very long period. I'm not aware of any other industries which are quite as far "behind" today as space launch systems were in 2010. But if anyone else is, please mention those industries here!

The semi spacex moment already happened - it was when TSMC was founded

I think rockets are insanely simple compared to silicon. The amount of research and development it takes to build a light source (hot tin plasma[1]) is extraordinary, and fabs are also probably the most complicated manufacturing facilities in the world. Tesla struggled mightily with integrating disparate auto parts manufacturers some years ago.

SpaceX and Tesla benefited from being helmed by a crazy person (in their nascent stages), who pushed to break norms in the conventional thinking, either "rockets can't be reused/we must spend $10B on a test campaign[2] before any part leaves the ground" and "EVs aren't cool". I don't think if Musk could design a rocket engine from scratch is relevant, but the strategic design patterns of 1) reduce requirements, 2) remove unused things, 3) simplify/optimize, 4) accelerate cycle times, 5) automate. Those points aren't revolutionary, just a more expanded "go fast and break things."

The computers that came out of Silicon Valley in the late 70s-into the 80s were a disruption to the old stalwarts like IBM. Though for silicon maybe I'm just trapped in that pre-SpaceX thinking.

[1]: https://phys.org/news/2020-05-exceptional-euv-hot-tin-plasma...

[2]: https://www.planetary.org/space-policy/cost-of-sls-and-orion

I think lack of focus on US domestic chip capability is semi-intentional and is an eventuality. Semiconductor industry, and many other manufacturing industries too, seem to flourish at very outer edges of the free world.

It could be simple as the free world not wanting manufacturing capability at home. It could be wanting only grain farms and money printers.

TSMC would likely never let itself be bought by a Western company. It's too vital to Taiwan's (and China's interest). The best that can be hoped is its ethical engagement with US chip players in decline.

But surely it wouldn't be impossible, with enough capital and initiative, to start a US-side TSMC clone on US soil? Just like the Valley successes of the 70s and 80s prompted savvy Taiwanese investors to found TSMC. We might need to start copying back some of their playbook to chart our own course to success, as they did with ours, then exceeded it with their out strategy and ingenuity, currently.

I think the issue is that TSMC exists, which takes up a lot of oxygen and opportunity. Whereas in space, there wasn't a high quality opportunity, so SpaceX had a lower hurdle to being the best (even though that still wasn't easy!).

By "SpaceX moment", I mean a startup entering an impossible market,

I think semiconductors is a difficult space for a SpaceX. SpaceX was relatively cheap - the company itself only raised 2 billion dollars, and according to Musk, the cost to develop Falcoln Heavy was "only" $500M. I think the "thesis" behind SpaceX is moreso that the technology to develop rockets had come down massively, but the market had gotten fat and lazy on government contracts. The market only seemed impossible because everyone just assumed so.

On the other hand ASML's EUV machine costs $300M and that's only a small part of what you need build your own Fab and barring some massive research breakthrough that isn't coming down any time soon.

By "SpaceX moment", I mean a startup entering an impossible market, where the barrier to entry is billions of dollars of research and manufacturing, a market dominated by industry giants from the 60s, and yet still coming out on top somehow.

This already happened and the startup was TSMC. Unfortunately for the U.S., it's in Taiwan.

Chip production seems another order of magnitude more expensive than space travel, when you look at tens of billions for a fab, but also several orders of magnitude more productive.

Maybe one of the e-beam startups can pull it off. Aside from scaling issues, direct electron beam lithography ought to outperform optical lithography by many metrics, not to mention that there would never be costs associated with mask revisions.

Here’s one of them: https://multibeamcorp.com/

I remember touring a little research fab, maybe around 2000, that could achieve feature sizes comparable to what TSMC can do today. But they were very, very, very slow.

(Fast-moving electrons are easy to make, easy to aim, and have teeny tiny wavelengths that entirely sidestep most the issues that people have with photons having obnoxiously large wavelengths. But electrons have all manner of downsides that explain why fabs spend many billions of dollars on optical lithography, one of which is that they repel each other, which makes shining a lot of them at a wafer at once quite problematic.)

By "SpaceX moment", I mean a startup entering an impossible market

SpaceX entered a market with hardly any competition (due to little demand) and is/was extremely reliant on government funding anyway.

Semiconductors are highly competitive and you can't rely on government agencies buying most of what you manufacture.

I'd argue Tesla might be much more closer to "startup entering an (somewhat)impossible market" considering how entrenched non Chinese car makers it was and how hard it was to survive in and especially start from scratch as a small company.

TSMC has been spending $15 - $50 billion per year for years to stay on top.

Estimates are it would take $200 - $300 billion just to catch up with them and little to no profitability for a decade while burning $10s of billions every year.

I think the federal govt is the only entity that has that kind of money.

Yeah, you've got Apple, Nvidia and AMD heavily exposed to that geopolitical risk, but seemingly not willing to help lessen it by investing in US fabs. Whenever I note this people here and elsewhere say "they're smart to be fabless" but somebody's gotta run fabs and more fabs need to be run in the US and quickly. I realize industrial policy isn't in vogue these days but it might be a good idea for the future of US semiconductor production to arrange some marriages between some of these companies that have a lot of capital and have a lot of need to reduce their geopolitical risk. Our brand of capitalism isn't great at looking ahead more than a quarter or two.

The geopolitical bit is that TSMC is building local US and EU fabs in case of a Taiwan invasion. Once those are up and Intel becomes redundant the ad hoc subsidies might just dry up.

Less so that thought. TSMC is Chinese via it being Taiwanese. No disparagement of regional uniqueness or actual ownership, just its success is a success of the Chinese people (into which Taiwanese are included). China will not substantially harm TSMC when it is so successful at destroying American dominance in a key industry. Taiwan and China are very much aligned when it comes to TSMC.

Maintaining a US native foundry might actually be a way to prevent war because one of the key triggers might be the moment where all major chip players totally depend on TSMC, which gives Chinese/Taiwanese massive leverage. Economically, might be a loss leader. But strategically, important, probably.

Plus, the government could even turn a profit reselling its purchased semiconductors to various US companies!

No freaking way. How do you think that’s feasible, considering how fast depreciation goes in semiconductors?

The payments are tied to real milestones like building fabs. Intel cannot spend the money on organizational inertia because that wouldn't get them the money.

The biggest reason is geopolitics: If escalated confrontation happens with China

If escalated confrontation happens with China, and that is massive IF that is dependent on insanely belligerent action from the West like giving nukes to Taiwan, then new semiconductor manufacturing will be the least of our worries. A Chinese blockade on Chinese and East Asian exports to US would result in total economic collapse in USA over a relatively short period. $100,000,000,000s in real demand for goods no longer being met over the span of weeks.

The possibility of direct conflict with China is the domain of armchair strategists that consume too many Reddit headlines, Peter Zeihan, Economist, etc., and individuals directly downstream of the defense budget, where Threat Inflation is good business. It's really not something that serious, intelligent people are anticipating on the horizon (again, outside of the wildcard of an insane new administration in Washington). Even the insane combo of Matt Pottinger, Mike Pompeo, John Bolton didn't get close to manifesting it (allegedly, some of their attempts were undermined by backchannel diplomacy from Gen. Milley and the JSOC). So what's the real risk?

remember that TSMC is built entirely on the back of ASML;

Probably a few people east of the Netherlands have noticed and are doing something about it.

$29b cash and about $50b in debt. They have a valid business still, but I think you're under appreciating how much of a hole they need to dig themselves out of.

Their current foundries can't just make other chips, and they certainly can't make GPUs for AI (TSMC make Intel GPUs). They are making a new foundry in Ohio, but in Intel's current state and comments they've made to the market it's not guaranteed the foundry will be built.

Intel might make it out of the hole, but it's going to get worse before it gets better. At their current trajectory their is not valid reason for the company to have 100,000 employees. I expect the recent layoffs are the first of a few.

ARM wins the instruction set wars and buys the tech. Future ARM processors will have x86 hardware that offers compatibility with legacy software. Eventually the instruction set is forgotten.

Not sure how much x86 is actually worth considering x86-64 is owned by AMD

MKL detects non-Intel processors and uses a slow code path.

But anecdotally, my company's AI pipelines which are NumPy/SciPy heavy run an order of magnitude faster (2 seconds vs. 20 seconds) on my laptop's Intel i7 than the do on my Ryzen 7, despite the Ryzen 7 being a newer gen than the i7.

I very very seriously doubt this is a like-for-like comparison. I suspect one case is multithreaded and the other not, or that one is using generic non-SIMD fallbacks or something like that.

There are a slew of foundries in the US already that aren't intel and are open to manufacturing for non-intel products. For example, Global Foundries.

I just don't see what benefit at this point the US government would see investing in intel when they aren't really a whole lot better at the game at this point vs pretty much anyone else.

Also, unlike TSMC, which the taiwainese goverment sees as a national asset and which actually garuantees them economic co-dependence with the west and thus independance from china,t he US seems to have forgotten that having your own manufacturing capability is very important for national security.

They aren't competitive right this moment, I suppose. Is that a reason to completely give up on all of the embedded knowledge inside the Intel IFS organisation?

Surely at some point you can make the argument that it's worth the investment for possible returns in the future, even if it costs a crazy amount of money right now. Trying to replicate what Intel has as another player would be even more exorbitant, presumably.

Historically Intel did use non-standard EDA tools which is one reason they had trouble getting outside customers onto 10 nm (besides the fact that 10 nm didn't work). Some Intel acquisitions like Fulcrum and Barefoot never used Intel fabs.

I think they're supporting a more standard toolchain starting with 18A.

The Altera merger was a perfect storm. I could write for pages about what went wrong. But here's a few key things: First FPGA companies have been massively hit and miss with their product - they were perfectly capable of screwing up their next chip all on their own (it's a mutually beneficial duolopy of crapness with Xilinx). Second, when Altera agreed to fab with Intel the deal was written such that Intel could never buy any FPGA company other than Altera, so from day 1 this wasn't "Let's produce this together" it was "Let's line up Intel to buy Altera" and so Altera never had to deliver anything, they just had to wait for the acquisition. Third, Altera were one of Intel's first customers and it turns out that Intel's fab process couldn't make some of the gates that Altera needed, which is why in the end they partitioned off the entirety of the transcievers to a separate tile fab'd by TSMC and sellotaped to the edge of the Stratix 10.

Also just to check your facts on the 10nm fab problems. Intel's first FPGA for Altera was always planned to be 14nm. It was totally trash for reasons entirely within Altera's control (don't rock the boat, just wait for the acquisition to close). And the synergistic products were a dead end. I'm sure the 10nm catastrophe didn't help but really that time would've been well spent unpicking the disaster of Stratix 10.

I see the semiconductor industry becoming a bit like the auto industry. A geopolitical pawn, heavily dependent on subsidies and in turmoil due to market forces (switch to electric in cars vs. switch to ARM/RISC in semiconductors)

I never thought of it that way. Are they going the way of Raythoen/Boeing?

To be clear, the outcome we actually need here is a bulwark against the possibility of China eventually being the world's only producer of leading-edge chips.

They skipped a release cycle with 14th gen (it's the same as 13th gen) and the lithography transition is basically finished already. It looks like Intel 18A will come out before TSMC N2.

That does not sound like the constructive confrontation of intels heyday.

agree. You need to get scrappy and back to basics. Create an internal startup that can act as a seed to rebuild their whole foundry business from the ground up. An incubator to nurture latent capacity and future potential.

Capacity building here has to be a long term play.

They’re 4-5 nodes behind Intel today, with no EUV machines let alone High NA EUV. They’re just not relevant in leading edge in the slightest.

Purely from the perspective of Intel and their shareholders it makes sense. But it's obviously a terrible idea for the world at large. TSMC and ASML need US based alternatives.

On the other hand, Intel is small enough to rescue. $82bn (market cap) is not the amount of money it used to be.