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Boeing missing key elements of safety culture: FAA report

hammock
76 replies
1d2h

The deficiencies found in the report were in Just Culture and Reporting Culture.

The five Key Elements of Safety Culture are:

1) Informed Culture- the organization collects and analyses relevant data, and actively disseminates safety information.

2) Reporting Culture- cultivating an atmosphere where people have confidence to report safety concerns without fear of blame. Employees must know that confidentiality will be maintained and that the information they submit will be acted upon, otherwise they will decide that there is no benefit in their reporting.

3) Learning Culture- an organization is able to learn from its mistakes and make changes. It will also ensure that people understand the SMS processes at a personal level.

4) Just Culture- errors and unsafe acts will not be punished if the error was unintentional. However, those who act recklessly or take deliberate and unjustifiable risks will still be subject to disciplinary action.

5) Flexible Culture- the organization and the people in it are capable of adapting effectively to changing demands.

Sources:

https://www.faa.gov/newsroom/Sec103_ExpertPanelReview_Report...

https://www.airsafety.aero/safety-information-and-reporting/...

burnerburnson
70 replies
1d2h

errors and unsafe acts will not be punished if the error was unintentional.

No sane organization would ever implement this. If someone repeatedly makes mistakes, they're going to get fired even if the mistakes are unintentional. Anything else is going to cause more safety issues in the long-term as inadequate employees are allowed to proliferate.

empath-nirvana
33 replies
1d2h

This is just blameless post mortems and many, many many places implement this.

There are always going to be some level of "inadequate" employees, and also perfectly adequate employees that sometimes make mistakes in any organization and if your organization requires that no employees ever make mistakes in order to operate safely, then you have serious problems.

The purpose of a statement like that is that you don't just have a post-mortem that is like: "Our company went off the internet because an employee had a typo in a host name. We fired the employee and the problem is solved." When in reality the problem is that you had a system that allowed a typo to go all the way into production.

error_logic
30 replies
1d2h

It's like that story of the pilot who, after his refueling technician almost caused a crash by using the wrong fuel, insisted that he always have that technician because they'd never make that mistake again.

s1artibartfast
27 replies
1d1h

the question is what do you do with the technician after the 2nd mistake. that is to say, When does this logic break down?

throwway120385
9 replies
23h48m

Redesign the system again if it's unintentional. It is almost impossible to control humans to the degree that they never make mistakes. It's far better to design a system in which mistakes are categorically impossible.

s1artibartfast
8 replies
23h23m

I'm trying to push back on the knee jerk sentiment that there are no bad employees, only bad systems.

There are no systems that are human proof, and what kind of human behavior is tolerated is a characteristic of the system.

In fact, there are humans that lie, cheat, are apathetic, and incompetent. Part of a good system is to not only mitigate, but actively weed these people out.

For example, if someone falsifies the inspection checklist for your plane, you dont just give them a PIP.

wolverine876
4 replies
21h14m

I'm trying to push back on the knee jerk sentiment that there are no bad employees, only bad systems.

Why is it important to you?

s1artibartfast
3 replies
19h33m

Because Im an engineer in a quality controlled field (Medicine), and my personal experience is that firms place too much faith in quality systems and not enough emphasis on quality employees.

I see lots of engineers and QA following a elaborate procedures with hundreds of checks, but not bothering to even read what they sign off on, so they can go golf all day.

People seem to think that you can engineer some process flow to prevent every error, but every process is garbage if the humans dont care or know what they are doing.

Every process is garbage is you dont hire workers with the right skills demanded by that process. In an effort to drive down costs, lots of companies try to make up for talent with process, with poor results, for both the companies and patients. you cant replace a brain surgeon with 2 plumbers and twice the instructions.

wolverine876
2 replies
18h46m

Very interesting, I'm glad I asked.

Similarly, I read some head of a leading engineering organization (I think a NASA head or maybe Admiral Rickover) who said, essentially, 'you can't replace ability with process'. All the process in the world, they said, will not substitute for highly able personnel.

But perhaps safety, not usually dependent on ability, is a different matter. Possibly, the problems you describe are a matter of leadership and management - which doesn't undermine your point; those also are things that can't, past a certain irriducible point, be replaced with process.

s1artibartfast
1 replies
18h16m

Possibly, the problems you describe are a matter of leadership and management

I wholeheartedly agree that leadership/management is a part of problem. My main objection is the "no bad employee" rhetoric. Sometime times the problem with management is that they aren't getting rid of bad employees. Rot can start anywhere in an organization, and the rest of the org really needs to push back, not just management.

It actually reminds me a lot of the culture/discipline problems with some Police departments in the US. It is hard to enforce and cultivate organizational culture top down. Most of it is maintained peer-peer.

wolverine876
0 replies
16h57m

I guess it seems like that argument takes the discussion to an extreme. Does anyone actually advocate never firing employees? That there are literally no bad employees?

It is hard to enforce and cultivate organizational culture top down. Most of it is maintained peer-peer.

I think it's a combination. The leader has a large influence; they set the standards and the norms. At the same time, I agree with what you say about peers - perhaps peers spread and 'enforce' those norms. It may also depend on the size and age of the organization.

xenadu02
0 replies
16h2m

Yes there are obviously bad employees but the line for actual incompetent/malicious employee is a lot further away than most people understand.

A lot of bad management is hand-waved as crappy employees (by management - shocking!)

mike_ivanov
0 replies
22h49m

Falsifying the inspection checklist is not a honest mistake.

wolverine876
5 replies
21h38m

That's not really the question:

Punishment culture assumes people naturally do bad, lazy things unless they are deterred by punishment and fear. Therefore we must punish mistakes.

That perspective has long been debunked. You don't see competent, skilled leaders using it. It turns out that generally people want to do well (just like you do), and they don't when they are scared / activated (in fight/flight/freeze mode), poorly trained, poorly supported, or poorly led. They excel when they feel safe and supported.

If you are the manager and the technician makes the same mistake the 2nd or 3rd time, you will find the problem the next morning in your bathroom mirror. :) At best, you have put them in a position to fail without the proper training or support. Leadership might also be an issue.

s1artibartfast
4 replies
19h52m

I would say that every skilled leader must use punishments and consequences to some degree.

If your tech gets drunk every day and doesnt do their job, you need to cut them loose. This isn't a management problem.

Sometimes people end up in positions where they are not suited and will continue to fail. If you hired a plumber and you need a doctor, that isnt an on the job training, support, or leadership issue.

reverius42
3 replies
19h34m

you need to cut them loose. This isn't a management problem.

That is 100% a management problem.

Sometimes people end up in positions

I wonder how they got in those positions? That sounds like a management problem too.

s1artibartfast
2 replies
19h24m

It isnt always managements job to make the person workout in the role. Sometime it is managements job to fire that person to find someone better.

Some people are bad fits for positions. They might look good on paper, they might be trying something new, they might lie to get hired, they might change after starting, they might have been a risky hire, or any number of reasons.

refulgentis
1 replies
18h9m

I think you're envisioning people all being absolutists who follow an exacting rule book and can't consider context. (that's covered by the *flexibility* tentpole)

As N approaches infinity, there's definitely a value of N at which we discover the root cause is the airman and have to move on from him. I don't think it's particularly interesting to try to identify a constant value for N because it's highly situational, and we know we have to do *just* and *reporting* as well, the reporting falls out when the just does.

s1artibartfast
0 replies
17h39m

You hit the nail on the head. I do perceive a lot of people being "no bad employee" absolutists.

All I am looking for is recognition that the content of N matters.

It is part of what I see as a broader phenomenon where people emphasize systems and ignore agents. In reality, agents shape systems and systems shape agents in continuous feedback.

lucianbr
3 replies
1d1h

If you implemented some changes so the mistake is caught before disastrous consequences, you're already doing better. Well enough to let the 2nd one slide. Even the 3rd. After that, action seems reasonable. It's no longer a mistake, it's a pattern of faulty behavior.

s1artibartfast
2 replies
1d

That is a big IF. At some point it comes down to the error type, and if it is a reasonable/honest mistake.

The situation is very different if the fuel cans are hard to distinguish vs if the tech is lazy and falsifying their checklist.

Underlying any safety culture is a one of integrity. No safety culture can tolerate a culture of apathy and indifference.

ethbr1
1 replies
1d

I expect there's precisely 1 safety culture that can tolerate a culture of apathy and indifference -- one in which no work is ever completed (without infinite headcount).

You apply risk mitigation and work verification to resolve safety issues.

Then you recursively repeat that to account for ineffective performance of the previous level of verification.

Ergo, end productivity per employee is directly proportional to integrity, as it allows you to relax that inefficient infinite (re-)verification.

s1artibartfast
0 replies
23h7m

Exactly! All this talk about man vs system misses the point that man is the system designer, operator, and component.

This is why Boeing cant just solve their situation with more process checks. From the reporting, they are already drowning in redundant quality systems and complexity. What failed was the human elements.

Someone was gaming the system saying that the doors weren't "technically" removed because there was a shoelace (or whatever) holding them in place, Quality assurance was asleep at the wheel, and management was rewarding those behaviors.

Plenty of blame to go around.

hughesjj
3 replies
23h3m

Well certainly not after the first time at least

Imo it's a function of time, company and team culture, severity, and role guidelines.

If an employee makes a mistake but followed process, and no process change occured, that's just acknowledging the cost of doing business imo and would be a unbounded number of times so long as it's good faith from the employee

roenxi
1 replies
21h24m

a function of ... severity

Not severity; that sort of thinking is actually part of low-safety cultures. A highly safe culture requires the insight that people don't behave differently based on outcome. In fact, most people can't assess the severity of their work (this is by design; for example someone with access to the full picture makes the decisions so that technicians don't have to). So they couldn't behave differently even if they did somehow make better decisions when it matters.

But, and I'll reiterate the point for emphasis, people make all their decisions using the same brain. It is like bugs; any code can be buggy. Code doesn't get less buggy because it is important code. It gets less buggy because it is tested, formally verified, battle scarred, well specified and doesn't change often.

hughesjj
0 replies
10h42m

Would s/severity/impact/g also be counterproductive of safety culture? Genuinely trying to learn here, gotta be responsible/accountable and all.

Maybe impact relative to carelessness/aloof-ity?

I agree that an engineer/person will not behavior differently based on outcomes, but if they know in advance something can have a wide, destructive blast radius if some procedure is not followed, I feel there's a bit more culpability on the part of the engineer. Regardless I don't think I feel I have a sufficient grasp on this concept I'm trying to define so definitely agreed I shouldn't have included 'severity' in the function definition nor any alternative candidate

s1artibartfast
0 replies
22h56m

My point is that good faith and sufficient competence are crucial. If the employee didn't care if the plane crashed, they are a bad fit.

If they cant read the refueling checklist, they are a bad fit.

Ideally you have system controls to screen and weed these people out too.

Log_out_
1 replies
1d

You take him into a boolean tree within a and with another employee for quality and put him on a improvement plan?

s1artibartfast
0 replies
1d

maybe. or maybe you turn them over to the authorities because the 2nd time their lazy and reckless disregard killed several people.

afp14
0 replies
17h27m

It's seemingly simple "oh the technician keeps messing up"

Did the technician mess up (sometimes true), or were they doing their job in good faith - was it the system/protocol/organization that made the task mistake prone? Did someone else actually mess up but the situation made it look like it's the technician's fault? Does this technician do a task/service that is failure prone? Are there other technicians on other tasks that are far less failure prone? Here the former technician would seem poor, the latter, excellent, but it's a function of the task/role and not the person.

I've been "the technician" - I catch a lot of blame because people know I'm anti-blame culture, so I'd rather take the blame on myself that point my finger to the next guy in line. I'm also willing to take on high risk tasks for the greater good even if they suck and are blame prone / risky. I believe in team culture in this way. If the organization doesn't respect that belief and throws me under the bus, I leave - which is quite punishing for them since they remain completely unaware of a major internal problem. If an organization "sees me" and my philosophy, then together we get very very good at optimizing the system to minimize the likelihood of failure / mistakes.

buildsjets
1 replies
1d

That was the late, and definitely great, R.A. "Bob" Hoover, I am proud to have shared a beer with him at Oshkosh. His Shrike Commander was miss-fueled with jet fuel instead of avgas because it was mistaken for the the larger turboprop model. Rather than blaming the individual refueler, he recognized that there was a systemic problem and developed an engineering solution. He proposed and the industry adopted a mutually incompatible standard of fuel nozzles/receptacles for jet fuel and avgas as a result. You can find some great YouTube material on him, or the film "Flying the Feathered Edge"

https://sierrahotel.net/blogs/news/a-life-lesson

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bob_Hoover#Hoover_nozzle_and_H...

https://www.imdb.com/title/tt2334694/

buildsjets
0 replies
22h53m

Here's an old timey video of Bob in his prime. At 8:55 he flys a barrel roll with one hand while pouring himself a glass of iced tea with the other. Hardest part was pouring the tea backhanded so the camera had a good view. Then he finishes with his trademark no-engine loop, roll, and landing.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PT1kVmqmvHU&t=510s

ChrisMarshallNY
0 replies
22h3m

> When in reality the problem is that you had a system that allowed a typo to go all the way into production.

That's a typical root cause, and is exactly what should come out of good post-mortems.

But human nature is human nature...

byteknight
13 replies
1d2h

Furthering the insinuation that everyone has the right to work every job. Sometimes people suck at their job.

error_logic
12 replies
1d2h

As your sibling comments mentioned, there's a difference between giving a chance for someone to learn from a single mistake without punishment, and allowing them to make the same mistake twice without taking matters out of their hands after.

If it's a really critical role, the training will have realistic enough simulation for them to make countless mistakes before they leave the training environment. Then you can assess their level of risk safely.

s1artibartfast
6 replies
1d1h

I think there is more nuance to it than that. Not everything is a mistake, not every mistake is recoverable, and not all skills are trainable.

The fundamental goal is to distinguish between recoverable errors and those that are indicative of poor employee-role fit.

nyrikki
5 replies
1d

Mistakes are the problem, as they will always happen.

The point is to build a culture where you value teamwork and adjust and learn from failures.

This isn't an individual team problem, this is an organization problem.

It is impossible to hire infallible, all knowing employees.

But it is quite possible to enable communication and to learn from pas mistakes.

When you silence employees due to a fear of retribution bad things happen.

People need to feel safe with calling out the systemic problems that led to a failure. If that ends up being the wrong mixture of skills on a team or bad communication within a team that is different.

Everything in this report was a mistake, and not due to gross incompetence from a single person.

The E door bolts as an example was directly attributed to metrics that punished people if they didn't bypass review. The delivery timelines and defect rates were what management placed value on over quality and safety.

Consider the prisoner delema, which is resolved by communication, not choosing a better partner.

s1artibartfast
4 replies
23h45m

I don't disagree with what you said about this instance, but I'm trying to push back on the knee jerk sentiment that there are no bad employees only bad systems- There are both. cultures that are too permissive of bad actors degrade the system.

Part of maintaining quality culture is maintaining red lines around integrity.

Like I said above, not all errors are recoverable or honest mistakes.

I work in medicine and a classic example would be falsifying data. That should always be a red line, not a learning opportunity. You can add QA and systemic controls, but without out integrity, they are meaningless. I have seen places with a culture of indifference, where QA is checked out and doesn't do their job either.

filleduchaos
3 replies
18h7m

I work in medicine and a classic example would be falsifying data

Certainly nobody has ever thought about that before. In fact, there definitely isn't a second sentence in the definition of aviation's just culture that is being completely ignored in favour of weird devil's advocacy.

4) Just Culture- errors and unsafe acts will not be punished if the error was unintentional. However, those who act recklessly or take deliberate and unjustifiable risks will still be subject to disciplinary action.

Oh wait.

s1artibartfast
2 replies
17h30m

I have no problem with the stated safety culture.

I simply agree that "that everyone has the right to work every job" is not a reasonable interpretation of them.

as stated above, a reasonable reader should understand:

Not everything is a mistake, not every mistake is recoverable, and not all skills are trainable. The fundamental goal is to distinguish between recoverable errors and those that are indicative of poor employee-role fit.
filleduchaos
1 replies
17h16m

Who is claiming that "everyone has the right to work every job", though? The only person to even bring up the sentence is someone who's handwringing about an interpretation that nobody was making to begin with.

This is why I called it weird devil's advocacy, because what exactly is the point of jumping to caution people about something they aren't doing?

s1artibartfast
0 replies
16h55m

Who is claiming that "everyone has the right to work every job", though? The only person to even bring up the sentence is someone who's handwringing about an interpretation that nobody was making to begin with.

Thats the parent in the thread we are posting in in. User Error-Logic replied, and I built upon their reply adding that:

goal is to distinguish between recoverable errors and those that are indicative of poor employee-role fit.

You and others wanted to dive further.

hinkley
4 replies
1d2h

This whole thread is missing the fact that the NTSB had a theory that transparency leads to safer airplanes, they tried it, and it works. People hesitate to self-report when it comes with punishment (fines, demotions, or just loss of face among peers). You need a formal “safe space” where early reporting is rewarded and late reporting is discouraged.

Safety is a lot about trust, and there is more than one kind of trust. At a minimum: are you capable of doing this thing I need you to do? Will you do this thing I need you to do?

zettabomb
3 replies
1d2h

It's not just the NTSB, it's part of things like the Toyota Production System. There's ample evidence to show both that punishment discourages safety and that lack of punishment encourages safety, across multiple industries.

nyrikki
1 replies
1d

Yes this is cross industry best practices.

Goodhart's law also applies, as in the case of the edoor bolts, Spirit intentionally bypassed safety controls to meet performance metrics.

The Mars Climate Orbiter is another example. While unit conversion was the scapegoat, the real cause of the crash is that when people noticed that there was a problem they were dismissed.

The Andon cord from the Toyota Production System wasn't present due to culture problems.

Same thing with impact scores in software reducing quality and customer value.

If you intentionally or through metrics incentivize cutting corners it will be the cost of quality and safety.

I am glad they called out the culture problem here. This is not something that is fixable under more controls, it requires cultural changes.

StableAlkyne
0 replies
22h20m

The Mars Climate Orbiter is another example. While unit conversion was the scapegoat, the real cause of the crash is that when people noticed that there was a problem they were dismissed.

Challenger too. Multiple engineers warned them about the O-rings. They weren't just ignored, but were openly mocked by the NASA leadership. (https://allthatsinteresting.com/space-shuttle-challenger-dis...)

A decade later a senior engineer at NASA warned about a piece of foam striking Space Shuttle Columbia and requested they use existing military satellites to check for damage. She was ignored by NASA leadership, and following (coincidentally) a report by Boeing concluding nothing was wrong, another 7 people were killed by a piss-poor safety culture. (https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=97600&page=1)

ethanbond
0 replies
23h52m

But but but what about my intuition and gotcha questions about how this could never work in practice?

icegreentea2
5 replies
1d2h

Just culture doesn't prevent you from firing someone who makes repeated mistakes.

In fact, Just Culture in itself provides the justification for this. As the next line says "However, those who act recklessly or take deliberate and unjustifiable risks will still be subject to disciplinary action". A person who repeated makes mistakes is an unjustifiable risk.

hinkley
4 replies
1d2h

When a punishment is applied with more deliberation, it can also be more severe.

wolverine876
3 replies
21h20m

Why is severity desirable? Or if it's not desirable, so what?

sokoloff
2 replies
20h41m

Severity is desirable iff it's justified. I wouldn't ever sign off on a policy that says "you'll be fired for a single mistake" (that would be a severity of punishment out of proportion to the risk/underperformance).

But a policy that never provided for the possibility of termination (insufficient maximum severity) is also not desirable.

wolverine876
1 replies
20h37m

Severity is desirable iff it's justified.

It's necessary if it's (necessary & efficient & justified); it's never desirable IMHO.

Doing severe things because they are justified is just acting out on a desire or drive - internal anger - but now we can 'justify' the target and feel ok about it. Lynch mobs think they are justified.

sokoloff
0 replies
4h21m

Designing severe things to be included as part of a process is a desirable property of that system if the severe thing is sometimes required.

No one is designing a formal system that includes lunch mobs. But a formal system of repercussions for employee behavior that does not include firing is an incomplete system.

It’s not that firing itself is ever desirable, but rather that its inclusion in a disciplinary progression is desirable.

applied_heat
2 replies
1d2h

You can really dumb it down to why didn’t you follow the checklist? If someone makes the same mistake after being corrected three times and the proper procedures exist for the worker to follow then the safety culture provides the structure and justification for their dismissal

buildsjets
1 replies
1d

No, you really need to smarten it up, and start off by making sure that your checklist is correct. Is it the correct checklist for the airplane model that you are building? Are all the right items on the checklist? Are they being done in the correct order? Do you have the correct validation/verification steps in your checklist? Does your checklist include all the parts that will need to be replaced? If the mechanic finds a quality issue while working the checklist and a job needs to be re-done, which checklists then need to be re-done? What other jobs are impacted by the rework?

All indications here (from the NTSB prelim and the widely reported whistleblower account) are that during rework for a minor manufacturing discrepancy, the mechanics on the shop floor followed bad manufacturing planning / engineering instructions to-the-letter, then the ball was dropped in error handling when the engineering instructions did not match the airplane configuration, because Boeing was using two different systems of record for error handling that did not communicate with each other except though manual coordination.

That's not the fault of the front-line assembly worker not following a checklist.

applied_heat
0 replies
22h50m

I agree with you. If the systems/procedures/checklists are bad it is not the fault of a front line worker.

I thought I was replying more to a parent comment addressing the inability to people go who repeatedly make mistakes, which is acceptable unless they are not following procedures.

ThrowawayTestr
2 replies
1d1h

I once destroyed $10k worth of aerospace equipment. I admitted it immediately and my only reprimand was that my boss asked me if I learned my lesson. (I did)

Log_out_
1 replies
1d

Once destroyed a industrial manufacturing site with a unfinished robot program that ran because I allowed myself to be distracted mid alterations.

wolverine876
0 replies
21h18m

And what happened?

dclowd9901
1 replies
1d2h

I think the wording is clumsy, but this is analogous no-blame processes. The wording is just accounting for the possibility of wontonly malicious or recklessly negligent work quality. Think someone either sabotaging the product, or showing up to work very high or drunk.

inglor_cz
0 replies
1d

This.

A mistake like "accidentally turning the machine off when it shouldn't be" is a fixable problem.

If someone has attitude like "fuck the checklist, I know better", it is not really a mistake, and that person should be rightfully fired or at least moved to a position where they cannot do any harm.

buttercraft
1 replies
1d2h

That's quite a leap from "unintentional" to "repeatedly."

wolverine876
0 replies
21h19m

Not at all: Systemic problems will result in repeated errors until the system is changed.

ClumsyPilot
1 replies
1d1h

Who do you think came up with this rule, bleeding heart liberals’? Stop and think for a second, why does that rule exist?

You described a fantasy world, in the real world everyone makes mistakes, and if the mistakes are punished, then there are no mistakes because no one reports them. That is until the mistake is so catastrophic, it cannot be covered up- that’s how you get Chernobyl or Boeing max

shiroiushi
0 replies
14h5m

Boeing max (if you mean the crashes caused by MCAS) wasn't due to a "mistake" not being reported, it was deliberate and intentional on the part of company management. The system was designed badly and without redundancy, and without any information available to the pilots about its very existence, specifically because management wanted it that way. It wasn't caused by some kind of accident.

zettabomb
0 replies
1d2h

Every sane organization implements this. Failure to do so leads to fear of reporting mistakes, and you get Boeing. This isn't news.

jjk166
0 replies
2h6m

If it's possible for an employee to unintentionally make the same mistake twice, that's purely management's failure. It's impossible to make systems completely fool proof, but once you know of a specific deficiency in your process you fix it. If you've corrected the issue, it should take deliberate effort for someone to do it again. An organization that knows its processes are deficient but makes no changes and expects a different result is insane.

inglor_cz
0 replies
1d

Ideally, as a result of the post-mortem, the same mistake shouldn't even be repeatable, because mechanisms should be introduced to prevent it.

And if someone keeps making new original mistakes, revealing vulnerabilities in your processes, I would say that it is a very valuable employee, a lucky pen-tester of sorts.

WheatMillington
0 replies
21h42m

Wowwww never become a manager please.

joe_the_user
1 replies
20h18m

I'd note that financial markets driven reorganizations are antithetical to elements 1-4 and this explains how Boeing managed to have a culture of safety but lose it (it's often put as MD management took but an article a bit back showed that this was part of the Boeing CEO seeing the financial writing on the wall). Uh, and that happened "under the watchful eyes" of the FAA.

The opposite of 1-4 could be described as the "culture of lies, ignorance and fear". Fear is a good strategy for getting people working hard (if not always well) and lies make fear universal. Compartmentalizing information is needed to allow more and more functions to be subcontracted. If the company is extracting maximum value from it's assets this year, it has no incentive to report problems that will only appear in the future - by the time the future rolls around, the share holders have their and the shell of the remaining company can be tossed away. etc.

Also, another HN commentator mentioned how eliminating a culture of lies and retaliation is once it's in place. There's never a guarantee that those revealing a problem won't be punished once regulators turn their backs.

And 5 is only useful once 1-4 are in place. Otherwise, it's a culture of flexibly hiding your shit in different places.

Edit: This article was on HN a while back. https://qz.com/1776080/how-the-mcdonnell-douglas-boeing-merg... Key quote: These decisions, made by Boeing CEO Phil Condit, were made with a close eye on the company’s bottom line ahead of a hotly anticipated commercial-jet boom. An ambitious program of cost-cutting, outsourcing, and digitalization had already begun.

euroderf
0 replies
12h30m

> 1) Informed Culture >> 2) Reporting Culture >> 3) Learning Culture >> 4) Just Culture > > I'd note that financial markets driven reorganizations are antithetical to elements 1-4

If this idea could be explored in depth, and more-or-less codified as received wisdom about market players, it would be a great contribution to management "science" and economics. My 0,02€.

lenerdenator
0 replies
1d

I'd say Learning Culture is also a problem.

Boeing has made numerous missteps in the last 15 years after being the world leader in airliners for around half a century. This only happens when knowledge about how to make a safe product is purposefully discarded and attempts to bring that knowledge back are intentionally ignored. In Boeing's case, it's due to desires for increased profits. They are unwilling to learn these lessons because it costs money that _may_ be there at quarter's end.

ethbr1
0 replies
1d2h

I thought this was critical:

> It also noted that employees do not understand how to use the different reporting systems and which reporting system to use and when.

As was noted by the purported insider, re: multiple overlapping systems of record/not-record, Boeing's actual processes themselves are badly in need of overhaul.

This feel like a clear example of where top-down + bottom-up independent read-back verification would have been useful.

I.e. management decides they're going to create Safety Process X using Systems A, B, and C. They do so, then circulate training (top-down). THEN you conduct independent interviews with employees at the bottom, to measure whether the new processes are understood at that level (bottom-up). If results aren't satisfactory, then add additional training or reengineer the processes.

Too often, it seems like this shit gets done at the VP PowerPoint level, and ground reality diverges without anyone noticing.

The map is not the world: interviews with a representative random sampling aren't hard.

crazytony
0 replies
18h47m

I'm really at a loss on this news. All the employees at airlines in the US I know of have this drilled into them on a regular basis and it's just taken for granted that you report incidents when they happen (even when someone falls: report it!) and the incident will get investigated.

It just confounds me (but explains a lot) that the manufacturer of the aircraft the airlines operate does not share a similar safety culture given that they are in a similar ecosystem (airlines report issues to the manufacturer and the FAA/NTSB all the time)

chongli
49 replies
1d4h

I think the ultimate problem with Boeing is that they're too big to fail. They're too important to the US's strategic interests so the government won't allow them to go out of business despite gross incompetence.

A classic case of "putting all your eggs in one basket."

spamizbad
11 replies
1d3h

IIRC Boeing's defense and airliner business units are separate. So they really aren't too big to fail: the defense side is insulated from the commercial airliner side.

lenerdenator
5 replies
1d3h

They are to a point. The military side typically uses Boeing's airliner offering as a basis for things like transport, AWACS, and logistics aircraft.

CobaltFire
4 replies
1d3h

I’m unsure what you mean by transport and logistics; we use civilian airframes with any amount of modifications for only one in production aircraft that I’m aware of (P-8 Poseidon is based on the 737). The TACAMO and AWACS are both based on the 707, which is long since out of production. None of our strategic lift capability (logistics in your comment?) is based on civilian airframes.

lenerdenator
3 replies
1d3h

KC-767, C-40, KC-46, E-4, VC-25.

CobaltFire
2 replies
1d2h

Thanks! I was in aviation, but primarily tactical and expeditionary. I always forget about the C-40 despite having ridden in one multiple times.

The E-4 and VC-25 aren’t really a fair one; you don’t need the divisions to be the same company for their integration (though I suppose it would make it vastly cheaper). We also don’t fly many at all (meaning cost per unit is relatively inconsequential).

I also somehow always forget the tankers. Thanks for that.

I’ll still maintain the links aren’t necessary. I honestly think a dedicated military platform for all of those would have been a smarter investment and that the current way of modifying airliners is suboptimal.

lenerdenator
1 replies
1d

It's agree it's probably suboptimal, but I don't think anyone's going to be willing to front the cash for development of a new airframe specifically for military/government use. The advantage of the airliner route is you have at least some revenue stream to fall back on if the military decides it doesn't want the new shiny or a court/congressional committee decides the military went about choosing the new shiny the wrong way, which happens often.

It's just a ton of financial risk. I guess the new supersonic startups like Boom think they bring enough novelty to the market to justify that risk.

CobaltFire
0 replies
22h46m

That’s a very solid point.

I do wonder why the heavy lift platforms won’t work (C-17, etc.).

tsunamifury
4 replies
1d3h

Commercial airline manufacture is also in our global strategic interest.

adolph
3 replies
1d3h

Why is that? Could it be that reduced commercial aircraft lead to better outcomes for high speed rail and future suborbital passenger rockets? Is seeing a strategic interest in commercial aircraft a local minima that prevents further improvement?

tsunamifury
2 replies
1d3h

This is some paranoid nonsense.

It’s that keeping capacity for one of the leading forms of global travel is a strategic interest. Don’t let your conspiracies get in the way of the obvious.

Also I feel like the rail circle jerk is so unearned. Last time I was in London it cost 100 pounds to fly to paris from London downtown airport and 600 to take the Chunnel. How “superior”.

bee_rider
0 replies
1d2h

I don’t see the paranoia or conspiracy in their comment. Plane based infrastructure could be a local minima that we’ve bungled our way into without any need for coordination.

adolph
0 replies
1d

Hey, no paranoid conspiracy intended. Simply thinking out the counterfactuals.

Is tying a particular activity to "national interest" itself a form of paranoia? What about passenger aircraft is a strategic interest? For example, the US seems to do ok with little large-scale shipbuilding outside military concerns. People seem to take cruises from the US in ever-larger cruise ships without a domestic capacity for building them.

Additionally, no disagreement on my part regarding the high regard people have for hypothetical rail. On the other hand, I'm open to the idea that high capacity terrestrial transportation similar to rail would have cause to improve if airplanes weren't in an optimization sweet spot.

amelius
9 replies
1d4h

Maybe true for the company, but certainly not for its management.

7thaccount
8 replies
1d4h

The last one fired got a $60M golden parachute and then became CEO of another company. There seems to be little incentive there.

chii
4 replies
1d3h

what gets to me is how anyone would hire the fired CEO given the reputation.

tass
0 replies
1d3h

I haven’t looked at their financials, but I’m assuming he successfully increased profits for Boeing.

He’s probably hireable so long as there’s no culture of safety or engineering to be destroyed.

lenerdenator
0 replies
1d3h

Typically it happens when buddies are on the board.

godzillabrennus
0 replies
1d3h

A known quantity to the industry who managed to deploy billions in budgets for a massive player is valuable at the helm of any company that wants those kinds of things.

lucianbr
2 replies
1d3h

What company did he become CEO of? Couldn't find anything on Google.

Tempest1981
1 replies
1d3h

New Vista Acquisition Corp.

lucianbr
0 replies
1d3h

I thought he was put CEO of an existing company that did something. This was just him and some buddies starting a new venture that didn't go anywhere, and they only lost money with it.

I mean, it's far less paradoxical than it sounded at first.

Sebb767
5 replies
1d4h

I think the problem is not that Boeing is too big to fail, it's the massive cost of designing, certifying and efficiently building a new airframe, which makes it hard for a competitor to emerge. The US doesn't really have another basket to put eggs into.

gmerc
3 replies
1d3h

Why is Airbus not falling out of the sky?

thelastgallon
0 replies
1d2h

"Air France and Airbus have been investigated for manslaughter since 2011, but in 2019, prosecutors recommended dropping the case against Airbus and charging Air France with manslaughter and negligence, concluding, "the airline was aware of technical problems with a key airspeed monitoring instrument on its planes but failed to train pilots to resolve them"

kayodelycaon
0 replies
1d2h

Not a great example. Any plane would have crashed with the pilots doing what they did. Most planes don't do well when you try to climb them out of a stall. (Climb out, not power out.)

dotnet00
0 replies
1d3h

Except that they have had issues with other things as well. Over on the space side, their Starliner crew capsule has had several safety debacles over the past 4 years, such that maybe it'll finally carry crew this year. First it was poorly tested software, then stuck valves, then the tape they wrapped certain wires in to make them more fire resistant turned out to not work, and then finally after all that testing, their parachute system had issues.

Boeing has had cultural issues for a while now, part of their rocketry division was forced to be spun out (by the government) with Lockmart's into ULA because Boeing was caught conducting espionage on Lockmart, which would've potentially disqualified them from bidding on launches. They had also had information leaked to them about bidding on the Artemis lunar lander contracts.

Plus other incidents like trying to get people at ULA proposing things like orbital refueling systems fired because if they allowed such technology to emerge, Boeing couldn't get blank checks from the government for building near-useless rockets.

That last one, in my opinion, making it clear that they're exploiting the perception that they're too big to fail.

dboreham
4 replies
1d4h

This argument doesn't make sense: the US military is also too big to fail, yet apparently reasonably competent.

fallingknife
3 replies
1d3h

The US military is a massive inefficient bureaucracy. Just look at the $5 billion and 8 years wasted on their failure to implement an ERP software system that is standard in large organiations https://www.thirdstage-consulting.com/lessons-from-the-us-ai...

Note the senate investigation report that describes an “organizational disaster” that caused the failure. Don't assume competence because of size and persistence.

kube-system
0 replies
1d3h

The US military is the largest employer on Earth, some amount of bureaucracy is inevitable. But they are not a business and do not optimize for dollar-efficiency like for-profit businesses do. They optimize for other goals.

'Wasting' 5 billion out of an 842 billion dollar budget, for an organization that doesn't even have to make money, is nothing. Plenty of startups squander even more money, and never accomplish any of the entire point of a for-profit company, making money.

bee_rider
0 replies
1d2h

What does efficiency have to do with anything? Efficiency and robustness are often opposed (one hates redundancy and the other loves it, for example).

CobaltFire
0 replies
1d3h

I think this is a common civilian misunderstanding of how the military breeds competence.

The US Military is absurdly competent at what its mission is, war fighting and logistics. What it is not competent at is things that are not yet internalized as part of that mission. Unfortunately non visible logistics (software) hasn’t made that cultural shift yet, and once it does will take a long time to breed the institutional competence that the military leans on, primarily due to the compensation gulf.

velcrovan
3 replies
1d4h

The federal government should buy a controlling share in the company, problem solved.

godzillabrennus
1 replies
1d3h

Federal government can’t run itself today. Probably not going to be effective running Boeing either.

velcrovan
0 replies
1h40m

Federal government can run itself fine as long as congresspeople aren't staging stunt shutdowns. They owned a controlling share in GM from 2009–2013 to bring the company out of bankruptcy. They own the Tennessee Valley Authority which operates no better or worse than other utility companies. The Alaskan sovereign wealth fund owns hundreds of companies and properties throughout the US.

There isn’t a meaningful difference in competence or bureaucracy between a too-big-to-fail company the size of Boeing and a large state institution. The difference would be in who can set the org-wide incentives and goals. Clearly shareholders aren't interested in safety being one of the goals.

euroderf
0 replies
11h38m

Isn't there some precedent for this in the automotive industry ? For example, in running Chrysler ?

FirmwareBurner
3 replies
1d4h

Isn't this what our version of capitalism encourages?

Grow to dominate so much of the market and of stock and pension portfolios at all costs, that you'll have to be bailed out no matter your incompetence.

So as long as this behavior only gets rewarded and never punished, why would you expect different results?

nequo
2 replies
1d4h

Car manufacturing is similar in a lot of ways yet notably different in the putting all eggs in the same basket sense that parent mentions. Ford and GM are too big to fail yet they do compete and it does lead to at least one of them making decent cars that don’t fall apart under you.

FirmwareBurner
1 replies
1d3h

Ford and GM have much more competition than Being. It's a lot easier to enter the auto market than the aircraft market.

nequo
0 replies
1d2h

That is true, but Boeing wasn't always the only player in aircraft manufacturing either. Even subsidizing two or three players so that they can compete might be better for safety and quality than letting them merge and operate as a complete monopoly.

ActionHank
2 replies
1d3h

Sure, but maybe fire and prosecute some of the execs?

Given that they are largely not responsible in delivering the value that will ensure continued success of the company, signal that risking the lives of people is not a good business strategy, and may act as a wake up call for others in leadership positions that they should be leading towards what is best for customers and the business and not what is going to give them the biggest short term payday.

euroderf
1 replies
11h42m

maybe fire and prosecute some of the execs?

Call me a cynic - but isn't an organization like Boeing designed to diffuse responsibility, so as to shield the guilty behind corporatespeak ? Sure you can subpoena millions of pages of documents and countless emails, but then the sheer size of the legal effort threatens to defeat the entire idea of assigning responsibility.

ActionHank
0 replies
4h51m

You're correct, but my point is that it should not be allow, especially in cases where the corp involved is directly responsible for the safety of end users.

mrtksn
1 replies
1d4h

How does a failure look like? I mean, this is not a financial institution and in the case of a financial failure people who make planes, the machines they use and all the IP wouldn't disappear.

The Boing might actually be too big to fail but their failure, IMHO, looks like what we have today: An inability to make high quality cutting edge aircraft. For the USA, the disaster would be to be reliant on EU/Russa/Brazil/Canada/China for conducting its transportation operations in this massive country.

What happens if people start freaking out when their planes are not Airbus? Would increase in government contracts keeping the stocks and profits the same mitigate the problems?

So maybe Boing has failed already, its just that its still institutionally solvent for one reason or another.

adolph
0 replies
1d3h

in the case of a financial failure people who make planes, the machines they use and all the IP wouldn't disappear.

Things get lost all the time. People move on, retire, machines require maintenance and remanufacturing, IP might describe an end state but not how to get there. Some say Boeing itself is an example of this after the MD merger.

lp4vn
0 replies
1d3h

Modern capitalism supresses competition, that's what happens. What if McDonnell Douglas had never been merged? What if Embraer had been bought by Boeing?

That's the harm that monopolies do to society and yet somehow they have been even incentivized in recent times.

lenerdenator
0 replies
1d3h

This is when you split the company's civilian aircraft operations into two companies.

jajko
0 replies
1d4h

No pressure for excellence usually leads to lack thereof

rapatel0
42 replies
1d3h

Boeing is another in the long list of companies that were taken over by process and finance people and driven into the ground with short term thinking largely centered on reducing cost-structure and financial engineering.

Elon has a great diatribe describing how the big automakers largely broke down and outsourced most parts manufacturing just became system integrators and customer support. In the short term, this is great for the bottom line, but it hollows out the engineering culture and make it extremely difficult to innovate. Imagine trying to get 100s suppliers to make small tweaks to each of their parts. Also, imagine when you need multiple suppliers to work together to build (NDAs, IP agreements, etc). You get buried in bullshit

Great companies are generally lead by R&D (product, science, engineering) with strong finance / process acting as gravity to keep the company grounded & functioning. When finance / process take over, then gravity will dominate and you crash

hef19898
13 replies
1d3h

Aerospace is all about process and safety so.

And hell, Elon almost ruined Tesla with his drive to over-automate manufacturing.

Getting to work 100s of suppliers, not all of which are directly managed by the OEM, together is happening all day, every day in all industries building hardware.

Seriously, HNs ignorance when it comes to real engineering and manufacturing is really frustrating.

chx
9 replies
1d2h

Aerospace is all about process and safety so.

As an aside, this is so much so the often used phrase "aerospace grade" whatever, especially on Kickstarters is just bull. There's nothing special in the materials, what they are concerned about is the ability to track every piece to where it comes from.

hef19898
6 replies
1d2h

Well, some of the materials used are special: aluminium alloys, titanoum alloyw, heat treatment, carbon fibers...

zettabomb
5 replies
1d1h

They're standard alloys with special process controls. "Aerospace grade" aluminum is commonly just 2024. "Aerospace grade" titanium is often 6Al-4V. What makes them special isn't the alloy at all but things like traceability, continuous monitoring and testing of critical material properties, and supply chain.

hef19898
4 replies
1d1h

And you are sure about that? Because that would mean I purchased a lot of the wrong raw materials in my life, and if so I really, really should tell my collegues in engineering, procurement and quality control about it.

zettabomb
3 replies
1d1h

Pretty sure, considering I work in aerospace. Can you name any alloys or materials you've used which are in some way specific to aerospace?

hef19898
2 replies
1d

Not anymore, as it is quite a while I bought them. After all, it was just a P/N. Given that we had a full blown lab doing samples for all raw materials we bought to make sure tze alloy, heat treament and other properties were correct, yes, it definetly was different alloys. Quite a few actually.

Depends on the actual use case of course: requirements for safety critical parts are higher than for less critical parts, say part connecting rotor blades to the rotor head had higher requirements than the door handle (both which were actual titanium in one case, and please don't ask why a door handle would be titanium to begin with...).

Generally so, to come back to your question:

I remember three different titanium alloys with different heat treatment we used back then. And at least five different alumium alloys. The Titanium ones were primarily aerospace, and export controlled depending in which form you bought it. And one particular steel alloy, not aerospace specific but also export controlled because it was dual use.

zettabomb
1 replies
23h32m

I think I see what you're saying - however I'm not hearing anything indicating a different aerospace-specific material, but rather aerospace-specific process. The raw stock with certs has a different P/N than that without certs, but not it's not a different material. For instance, we might procure aluminum 7075, which has a published spec in the form of ASTM B209 (and several others, this is one I've seen called out in drawings commonly). 7075 is available in multiple different tempers - you can get 7075-O (not heat-treated), 7075-T6, 7075-T651, and a few other less commonly used ones. When used for aerospace, that material will generally come with a cert from an independent test lab showing that a specimen from the batch meets the yield strength, ultimate tensile strength, yield at rupture, composition, and other critical properties. At the end of the day, the piece of round bar or sheet is the same thing you'd purchase otherwise, but you've paid quite a bit extra to be SURE that it's exactly what you expect. The same applies to steel, titanium, nickel alloys like Inconel or Monel, tungsten, magnesium, and pretty much everything else I can think of.

Following procurement, we might do in-house testing before machining (composition with XRF, physical properties with a tensile tester), possibly our own heat treatment (e.g. 13-8PH, 15-5PH, 17-4PH are "precipitation hardening" steels, generally delivered soft), and surface treatment (passivation, conversion coating) before delivering a finished product. None of this is unique to aerospace either, although it's certainly unlikely you'd want to spend the money for it otherwise.

So yes, you procure a different item, possibly from a different supplier, but physically there's unlikely to be any difference in my experience. The exception I'm aware of would be electronic components, particularly semiconductors, which are manufactured using different processes for radiation hardening (e.g. sapphire substrate). Export control like ITAR/EAR aren't really about aerospace but rather restrictions imposed by the US Government.

hef19898
0 replies
23h22m

Of course there is no "aerospace only" alloy. There are a whole bunch of specialized alloys that get primarily used in aerospace so, and those are a far cry from your average construction material alloys (those get used to, but pose their own kinds of challenges). That's the whole point. Also, P/N were internal, of course the supplier had different PNs, including or excluding certificates and such things.

And before some asks, no, those inventories, the ones with and without certificates and paper work, never get mixed. That they don't is actualy audited.

If go away from metalic materials, there is only a limited number of suppliers for aerospace grade carbon fibres: Torray and two others I can't remember the names. And those fibres actually are different from the non-aerospace ones in some cases, while in others they quite similar to the non-aerspace ones technically.

Overall I think we agree so. And yes, people tend to oversell the "aerspace grade" stuff. As they do with "mil-spec".

ITAR is a pain in the ass, on top of being a US government thing not limited to aerospace.

Surface treatment is tricky, as a special process (for QA purposes, those have rigorous standards) they take ages to get certified.

applied_heat
1 replies
1d2h

And be confident it is what it is meant to be, and meet the standards it is meant to meet

hef19898
0 replies
23h7m

One of the first thing an old hand told me in my first days on the job, in aerospace, was: If you have a part, but have no paper work you can match against the part that tells you what it is, you can throw the part away. So, never loose documentation.

I took that to heart. Took a case of a switcheroo, mixing items that looked similar but aren't, to really drive the point home.

dpflan
2 replies
1d3h

What would be good resources to learn more about "real engineering and manufacturing" to help educate the community?

hef19898
0 replies
1d2h

Any book about basic engineering is a good start, 101 course materials. Also, people with a mechanical, electrical, manufacturing, industrial, aerospace or other engineering background. Some of us are also on HN.

beacon294
0 replies
1d2h

Sorry that knowledge is restricted to real engineers. /s

matthewdgreen
7 replies
1d3h

Elon has a great diatribe describing how the big automakers largely broke down and outsourced most parts manufacturing

For a company that purports to be an energy storage and generation business (with cars as an initial application), Tesla remains hugely dependent on their own suppliers. Panasonic occupies a major chunk of Tesla's own Gigafactory and has repeatedly delayed the production of new cells [0], [1].

[0] https://electrek.co/2024/01/15/panasonic-to-soon-make-new-ba... [1] https://www.reuters.com/technology/panasonic-delays-producti...

amluto
5 replies
1d1h

I’m no expert, but I do recall Tesla saying, at the beginning, that they were using 18650 cells because they were widely available. Well over a decade later, the major battery makers are producing prismatic cells in volume, and Tesla is still working on their fancy new cylindrical cell. I wonder if they’re doing this is due to some kind of design inertia at this point.

Right now, I can buy US-assembled complete energy storage systems (not necessarily at volume), retail, using prismatic LFP cells, for a lower price per unit energy than the Tesla Megapack.

toomuchtodo
4 replies
1d1h

Tesla uses prismatic cells as well. You are no expert (as you said), and of course you can buy your own storage cheaper than turnkey utility scale systems. Energy developers aren’t building their own systems; they cut Tesla a check and install the asset (orchestrated by Autobidder).

https://insideevs.com/news/542064/tesla-model3-lfp-battery-p...

Tesla uses LFP cells supplied by a Chinese manufacturer - CATL, which has basically become a strategic partner with a contract for the next several years.

Because the LFP chemistry does not offer as high energy density as NCA or NCM, Tesla uses LFP only in the standard range versions of its cars (produced in Shanghai and soon globally). LFP will be used also in Tesla's energy storage systems.
matthewdgreen
3 replies
1d

This seems to confirm the initial point, which is that Tesla mainly outsources its most critical ingredient (batteries) to outside suppliers. Suppliers that are, incidentally, increasingly competing directly with its main lines of business. That might be ok in the car industry, where people will pay a premium for brand names. Seems bad if your goal is to dominate energy storage.

toomuchtodo
2 replies
23h40m

No one builds energy storage at the rate Tesla does, so while this risk keeps being surfaced on HN ("but what about..."), until there is material movement from competitors, "meh." If it's so easy, by all means, do it. But talk is relatively cheap.

https://www.energy-storage.news/tesla-deployed-nearly-4gwh-o...

https://www.energy-storage.news/tesla-deployed-6-5gwh-energy...

https://carboncredits.b-cdn.net/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/T... (Source: https://carboncredits.com/tesla-413m-megapacks-revolutionize...)

Such tremendous growth has been particularly attributed to ramping up Tesla’s Megapack production capacity in its recently built 40 GWh Megafactory in California. The company aims to produce 10,000 Megapacks each year in this factory.

Earlier this year, Tesla also revealed plans to construct another 40 GWh Megafactory in Shanghai, China to meet the robust demand for its energy storage systems. Construction will start later this year.

https://electrek.co/2023/12/22/tesla-launches-project-build-...

The global market for energy storage is enormous, approaching almost half a trillion dollars by 2030.

https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/us/Documents/...

https://www.precedenceresearch.com/energy-storage-systems-ma...

matthewdgreen
1 replies
22h7m

I'm as excited about this progress as anyone. But (1) Tesla's Megapack business isn't objectively that big compared to its other businesses, (2) while it may be big in the future, that assumes they don't face serious competition from cheaper suppliers, (3) Tesla currently seem to be hugely reliant on Chinese suppliers and factories to build its storage, with no immediate plan to change this, and (4) the Chinese government and battery sector has made clear that it intends to dominate these industries at any cost.

Saying "I'm not worried about this" is like saying you're not worried about a giant truck that's speeding directly at you. The question I'm asking in this thread is whether Tesla has a plan to avoid getting hit by it.

toomuchtodo
0 replies
21h58m

I assume their plan is to continue to have the business run by the human equivalent of an AI reward maximizer. It has worked for them so far to have obsessive people in key leadership positions, and I would expect it to continue to work. Without material non public information from Tesla internal, hard to say either way, we can only speculate. Past performance does not guarantee future returns, but still valuable signal.

lenerdenator
7 replies
1d3h

Ironic for Elon to be complaining about the bureaucracy of automakers and how it drags down production quality.

fasteddie31003
6 replies
1d3h

Elon fan boy here. My Tesla has been a pretty solid car compared to any Crysler or GM car that I've owned before.

fkyoureadthedoc
2 replies
1d3h

You should try owning a Toyota

psunavy03
1 replies
1d2h

. . . who had their own major scandal about self-accelerating vehicles.

peterfirefly
0 replies
20h32m

Which mysteriously only affected the US -- while the Toyota's remained extremely safe cars there.

cyanydeez
1 replies
1d3h

yeah, you should've switched to any number of japanese imports.

dahart
0 replies
1d2h

I used to think the same, but I’m not sure sure anymore after having a Honda CRV completely die on me last year when it was ~5 years old, well maintained, and lightly driven. It may have been the electronics design that prevented any mechanics from being able to diagnose what was wrong. There was a recall on the air compressor that might have contributed. Can’t be sure, but the electrical systems all stopped functioning due to an unknown problem. We tried to have it serviced over and over again, paid to replace many parts that were not the cause and did not fix anything, only to have the issue persist and then one day (on the way to the shop for another service) the timing belt melted and took out a number of other parts with it. After $5k in repairs, it ran fine for a few weeks and then the electronics shut down again over an unknown problem. Honda at least recognized this was design failure and ended up covering some of the repair costs, but I couldn’t get rid of this lemon fast enough.

Personally, I suspect we’ve recently entered a new age of cars that depend on electronics much much more heavily than before, and that we do not have great data yet on the reliability of these software systems, and that Japanese mechanical engineering advantages of yesteryear don’t necessarily mean they have good software, nor does it compete with bad software.

coliveira
0 replies
1d2h

Well, if you compare to Chrysler or GM, anything will do.

spamizbad
3 replies
1d3h

Teslas are perfectly fine vehicles with by far the most impressive software technology. But I wouldn't exactly hold them up as being particularly high quality, especially compared to Japanese and Korean automobiles.

AmVess
1 replies
1d2h

No better or worse than US or EU cars manufacturers, all of whom have been doing this a LOT longer than Tesla.

spamizbad
0 replies
1d2h

I would say there are definitely fit-and-finish areas where they lag behind both (eg: panel alignment). That's not really around reliability tho.

amluto
0 replies
23h15m

far the most impressive software technology.

I find it somewhat impressive in the sense of “wow, they put a lot of not-really-necessary software in here and it still manages to mostly work reliably.”

But the actual critical software parts the make it work as a car are not, in my book, particularly impressive. My first car’s ECU glitched once in the entire time I had it, and I think it was actually quite unusual for a car of that model to have an ECU glitch at all. My Tesla regularly has glitches that affect the ability to start the car or operate systems that really ought to work all the time.

SoftTalker
2 replies
1d2h

This ignores the reality that most customers will buy the car / take the flight that is $5 cheaper and don't care about any of that.

Great engineering culture doesn't mean a lot if can't sell your product.

jewayne
1 replies
1d2h

Yeah, those 737 MAXes are selling like HOTCAKES these days!

SoftTalker
0 replies
1d2h

They will be next year, and customers will be back on Kayak and Expedia sorting by price and clicking the top result to book.

peteradio
1 replies
1d2h

Why did the engineers allow this? They had no power? Why? I have a general sense that many engineers take the position of "tell me what to do and I will only ask why X times." I think its a self-serving but ultimately shortsighted position like a tragedy of the commons. Did engineers actually push back on these decisions? "I walk" etc? At some point a man needs to be willing to go back to the dirt with a hoe in hand when his principles are subverted. I get it, you can find yourself in a position of a slow moving landslide and have to deal with things related to sunk costs in a boiling bucket and your companion is only a frog. Still, where does this lead in the long term? Engineers should see themselves as the brick and mortar of a nation not some extractive force in a financialized environment. What are you leaving your(the) children?

I was reading a story about the decisions made by miners in UP Michigan in 1912. You know what they did when shit sucked? They walked and did something else for 2 years. They let the equipment rot with intent going as far as to coerce the machine maintainers to cease and desist with machine hibernation procedures.

dmoy
0 replies
1d2h

I was reading a story about the decisions made by miners in UP Michigan in 1912. You know what they did when shit sucked? They walked and did something else for 2 years. They let the equipment rot with intent going

Jesus, or what the miners in the Appalachians did in 1912. After the mining company refused to deal with a unionized workforce, they were replaced by armed guards. The miners got kicked out of there housing, etc. So in response, the miners formed a militia and went to war with the company, like literal war with guns. They got steamrolled by the state guard. But eventually that got them to negotiate a 9 hour workday.

Then they did it again 10 years later, except that time they got steamrolled by the US military, and then the feds threw hundreds in prison for treason.

geraneum
1 replies
1d2h

big automakers largely broke down and outsourced most parts manufacturing just became system integrators and customer support

Apple outsources manufacturing and it’s doing just fine. Has not hallowed out their engineering yet.

dghlsakjg
0 replies
1d2h

Apple very famously maintains incredible control over their partners' and their process.

LeifCarrotson
0 replies
1d2h

Great companies are generally lead by R&D (product, science, engineering) with strong finance / process acting as gravity to keep the company grounded & functioning. When finance / process take over, then gravity will dominate and you crash

But to continue the metaphor, a great company will have enough forward momentum that at any time they can pull back on the stick, relying on inertia in their supply chain, designs, customer name recognition, and existing capital assets to briefly zip almost straight upwards really, really fast for a short amount of time. If you want an upwards trajectory for 100 years, it won't work, you'll soon stall, but if you want an upwards trajectory for the next quarter it works phenomenally well!

The root of the problem, I think, is that it's really hard to measure long-term assets like culture and trust, but really easy to game short-term metrics by dumping long-term assets.

whitej125
32 replies
1d3h

20 years ago nobody thought there'd be a another US automaker beyond the big three (Ford, GM, Chrysler)... yet today here we are with Tesla and a list of others.

Are there any other US companies today that could ostensibly be viable alternatives to Boeing's spot 20 years from now?

Electric-first-and-only was the differentiator for Tesla vs big three... what differentiator will it be in the aero industry?

wand3r
13 replies
1d3h

Boom is taking a Tesla approach to aerospace focusing on high end first with a Concord replacement. I am sure there are others working their way up the value chain

consumer451
9 replies
1d2h

Has Boom found a new engine supplier yet?

buildsjets
8 replies
23h55m

Every major and minor engine manufacturer punted, so now they're making their own. https://boomsupersonic.com/symphony

Hired an experienced propulsion guy away from Boeing to run the show. https://boomsupersonic.com/team-members/scott-powell

They are not going to be able to do it, my opinion. There are very few people in the world who have deep experience doing 3D CFD on supersonic turbofans, I've talked to a few of them and none have been headhunted. The will need good analysis work, they are asking for a LOT out of a single stage fan. They certainly will not have the metallurgical research and manufacturing technologies of the engine manufacturers to use. But best of luck to Scott, his Porsche GT3 was getting kind of old and needs to be upgraded to the latest model.

hef19898
4 replies
22h50m

If they hired a propulsion guy from Boeing to develop a new super-sonic engine, Boom fucked up. Boeing, same for Airbus, doesn't develop or built engines, let alone super sonic ones.

But dor sure, said Boeing hire will be royaly paid for his service, good for them. And good for Boom, a prominent Boeing hire will make fundraising so much easier.

But sure, as if building a new commercial airframe manufacturer isn't hard enough, becoming a new jet engine manufacturer on top of that is a winning strategy...

buildsjets
3 replies
22h24m

In the specific case of Mr. Powell, I would agree that his skill set is primarily in the management of procuring and integrating of new engines from engine vendors into new airframes, and in the detail design of engine accessories and externals, and he is not experienced in the design of internal turbo machinery. And that's where the high risk for Boom is.

However you would be completely mistaken to think that Boeing, and Airbus, and my friends down there with Embraer, do not have people who actively pursue and develop the core technologies needed to develop, analyze, and test all types of turbine engines, even if they do not result in market products. It is a necessary tool in order to evaluate offerings from the different competitive engine vendors. And at the senior level of engineering, there is basically a revolving door between the airframe manufacturers, the engine manufacturers, and a few of the high-level engineering focused airlines. People are constantly jumping around between them, there is a lot of cross-pollination going on.

hef19898
2 replies
22h0m

Yeah, I know some of those engineering managers. They all work best in well-established, large orgs with people knowing the ins and outs of their jobs.

The last time they actually developed something is quite a while ago. And managing engine suppliers, and component suppliers only gets you so far in developing the engines yourself. And we are talking super sonics ones.

ghaff
1 replies
19h39m

Designing airframes isn't easy but aren't really novel. This is about coming up with engines that don't have noise concerns and have economics that would allow airlines to operate aircraft at prices that aren't that out of line with current ticket prices. It's not at all clear how big the market is for very premium tickets for supersonic travel is transatlantic and transpacific has a bunch of other range issues.

hef19898
0 replies
9h53m

Conventional airframes are not novel, building an aircraft is still incredibly hard so.

Civilian super sonic airframes so are novel, nobody did that since the days of the Concord and its Tupolev clone.

consumer451
1 replies
21h50m

This is a tangent, but you are well informed in the space, and I would love to read your opinion.

There is a new heli player trying to start from clean-sheet, called Hill Helicopters.[0] They are building a sleek new carbon fiber fuselage, but what I am wondering about is the fact that they are also making their own turbine engine.[1]

I have assumed that their new turbine is the hardest part of their plan, am I correct in that assumption? Is it crazy, or not crazy, that they are trying to do this themselves?

[0] https://www.hillhelicopters.com/

[1] https://www.hillhelicopters.com/gt50-engine

buildsjets
0 replies
12h39m

I would say it is not impossible for them to do it themselves if they are adequately funded, but I question the wisdom of choosing to do so rather than buying an existing certified turboshaft engine off the shelf, of which there are many in that power range. Also, that seems like an excessive amount of power for that size helicopter. A similar horsepower engine is the Pratt-Whitney PW206B, used in the Eurocopter EC135. But the EC135 is a much larger helicopter and has twice the payload capacity of this design.

The engine itself is a fairly standard centrifugal compressor design, not particularly challenging from an engineering, or material science standpoint. But with no new technology being brought to the table, there is no performance reason roll your own engine, and you are going to have to beat existing engines that have decades of refinement behind them.

I know of two other companies developing microturbines that are considerably smaller than this in an market where there is no real competition, with some cool new technologies like regenerative microtube recuperating heat exchangers. One of them is in development, one is flying their turboprop and developing their turboshaft.

https://www.turbotech-aero.com/

https://turb.aero/

There is a design/prototyping/manufacturing company called ConceptsNREC https://www.conceptsnrec.com/home that specializes in turbine engine and pump design. They do analysis work for basically every jet engine manufacturer and automotive turbocharger manufacturer, have manufacturing facilities to prototype just about every part of a jet engine, and an extensive testing facility. I would just about bet that Hill has used their services in the design and prototyping of their engine. It's a great place to work if you have a PhD in aerodynamics but want to live in rural Vermont. They also sell a CAD design and CFD analysis software package specific to turbomachinery.

If you like industrial stuff, here's a video of their prototype shop, showing some of the parts they make. My favorite is a tiny titanium impeller for a jet fuel starter system on the F-22, at 3:35. It's about the size of a quarter, and took 40 hours to machine with an 0.020" / 0.5mm diameter ball end mill. I've met both the guys in the video, they are brilliant machinists, but definitely not well polished youtube influencers, lol. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6v98_oxqY7E

ghaff
0 replies
23h48m

I wish them the best but, even if they can get the technology to more or less work, the economics and regulatory environment are pretty tough.

At the end of the day, it's almost certainly going to be an expensive airline ticket and even if United was (rather inexplicably) touting Boom in their advertising, I'm not sure how many customers there are to pay out-of-pocket for supersonic flights that are likely to be a premium over current top-end seating. I'd love to zip over to Europe a lot faster from the East Coast of the US. But I'm not going to pay as much to save time as I would for the rest of my trip.

hef19898
2 replies
1d3h

Boom still isn't dead yet?

notatoad
0 replies
1d1h

Boom won’t die until the saudis give up on supersonic flight as a method to increase the demand for oil.

ghaff
0 replies
1d3h

Boom has all these fans on sites like this--and to be clear I wish Boom well--who also wouldn't consider spending $10K for a comfortable lie-flat seating flight from the US to Europe.

dghlsakjg
6 replies
1d2h

Maybe one of the private jet manufacturers?

In the US we have Cessna and Gulfstream, and in Canada we have Bombardier which designed and sort of made the CSeries/A220 in Alabama in conjunction with Airbus.

The whole Bombardier CSeries fiasco was basically Boeing using the US government to try to kill Bombardier because they had managed to put together a plane that was very competitive with with the 737-MAX in a number of categories. The takeaway though is that it is possible, with significant government support, for a small jet manufacturer to put up a feasible competitor to Airbus/Boeing.

0xffff2
5 replies
1d1h

I think you mean Textron and General Dynamics. Cessna and Gulfstream haven't been independent companies for 10 and 20 years, respectively.

buildsjets
2 replies
1d

Also, they did not "try to kill Bombardier", they did kill Bombardier, at least as far as the commercial jet industry is concerned. Bombardier does not sort of make the CSeries/A220 in Alabama in conjunction with Airbus. The CSeries does not exist any more, the A220 is now a 100% Airbus program, as of Feb. 2020, Bombardier has zero involvement in it.

dghlsakjg
1 replies
20h14m

Bombardier jets are not dead just their passenger airline jets, they are still making jets, just not the CSeries, and nothing for the airline industry.

The Alabama A220 production started while Bombardier was still a partner which is why I used past tense "made" and "sort of"

buildsjets
0 replies
13h43m

That’s EXACTLY what I just said. They completely killed Bombardier at least as far as the commercial jet industry is concerned.

Bombardier now makes no commercial jet aircraft. Zero. None. They still make a few general aviation jet aircraft, but that product line is also dwindling. They completely stopped production of all their Lear products in 2021.

dghlsakjg
1 replies
18h57m

Sure, if you want to play semantics: Cessna Inc. owned by Textron Aviation Inc. owned by Textron Inc., and Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. owned by General Dynamics Corporation.

Both are wholly owned subsidiaries of their respective parent corporation ownership chains, and are commonly known by Cessna and Gulfstream.

0xffff2
0 replies
1h4m

My point being that they are such small companies that they weren't even viable as independent businesses. It's a joke to think that they could even remotely scale up to a viable Boeing competitor in this century.

rafale
3 replies
1d3h

The barrier of entry is much higher with commercial aviation. You can get started with a lousy car but a lousy plane will never be acceptable. The MAX fiasco could have killed Boeing. Maybe Boom will succeed by getting its feet wet in the supersonic flight niche. Time will tell.

01HNNWZ0MV43FF
1 replies
1d2h

Well, you could make a small plane if it's not lousy. Lilium and Electra are betting on something like an air taxi niche opening up if the fuel savings are worth it: https://www.electra.aero/ https://lilium.com/jet

hef19898
0 replies
22h49m

At least Lilium is at least a couple of years, and billions, away from having a product they can sell.

jowea
0 replies
23h50m

Maybe start with a small plane instead of a lousy plane?

ponector
1 replies
1d2h

Imagine you've spent 20 billion USD to develop, certify and create a production line. How you're going to convince airlines to buy hundreds of new planes they have no pilots for, no maintenance facilities and no predictions of reliability?

thehappypm
0 replies
17h57m

It'd be a business decision; it'd be hard to imagine a brand-new manufacturer of a competitor to the 737 doing well for that reason. But maybe a supersonic jet, or electric-powered with lower operating costs, or more automation to reduce pilot needs.. there are many ways to innovate.

akira2501
1 replies
23h15m

Another differentiation for Tesla was not having the dealership model. Perhaps the things not acknowledged are more important than those that are.

ghaff
0 replies
18h53m

I'm not sure how big a differentiation it was. There are no haggle dealerships, a lot of people still need financing, and people still need to get their cars serviced.

whimsicalism
0 replies
1d2h

There's even more government protectionism/capture in plane makers than automakers.

It would have to be a horizontal play by an existing company with large amounts of capital and relationships, like a Lockheed Martin or something.

peterfirefly
0 replies
20h43m

It might even be Tesla again.

Somebody, somewhere will make an electric jet that is good enough. It will be very destructive for the old manufacturers, for old airports, and for many airliners. It won't need the long airways we are used to so we will likely get more point-to-point like travel to/from city centers (multiple sites for bigger cities).

Longer-distance travel will still remain the remit of traditional jets -- but they will have a much smaller market so there won't be much R&D, except through state subsidies and military contracts.

ARandumGuy
0 replies
1d

Probably the biggest barrier to a new creating a new commercial airline manufacturer is that there just aren't that many new planes sold each year. There aren't that many customers for commercial airplanes, and existing airplanes can last for decades when properly maintained.

Combine all that with the inherently high costs of running a commercial airline manufacturer, and there just isn't enough demand to support more companies in the space. Changing that would require huge technical breakthroughs, or fundamental changes to how passenger air travel works. Neither of those seem to be likely in the near future.

cameroncf
26 replies
1d3h

Isn't this just confirming a seemingly widely held opinion that the safety culture started to break down after 1997 after the merger with McDonnell Douglas?

See also: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=26417095

beowulfey
19 replies
1d2h

Isn't this just confirming a seemingly widely held opinion

Yes-- this represents formal acknowledgement by a regulatory agency. The hope is that agency can now use this formalization to enforce change within Boeing.

dclowd9901
13 replies
1d2h

And, what, undo capitalism? The motivating forces here are profit, plain and simple. I've come to think that it's not only probable, but _inevitable_ that any growth-oriented, profit-motivated company (read: any company) will reach a point that their only remaining growth path is to undermine quality.

masklinn
4 replies
1d1h

Capitalism is a tool, not a force of nature*.

It can be channeled, directed and mitigated. That is what regulations and regulatory agencies do. Although of course you need to watch the watchers so they don't get captured.

* and even if it were, we channel, direct, and mitigate forces of nature all the time, if not always to great success, or without consequences

bumby
3 replies
1d1h

of course you need to watch the watchers

I don't cut Boeing much slack, but some of this also falls on the FAA for delegating certain oversight activities to the manufacturer. I assume they do it for manpower reasons (ie there just aren't enough FAA employees to do the job sufficiently).

masklinn
1 replies
1d1h

I don't think there's any need to cut Boeing any flack to point out that the regulators did fail to do due diligence.

It is understandable that regulators would take a lighter hand to a company which has shown good ethics — which was historically the case of Boeing (more of an issue if that is because of not being able to handle the load), it's a problem if they go completely hands off.

I don't think the FAA is the sole culprit here either, we've not heard much of non-american regulators. While it makes sense that the FAA would be the primary regulator for Boeing, that regulators would cooperate internationally, and that non-primary regulators would have to be careful e.g. around the risk of being called out for trade restrictions, I still feel non-US regulators should have been a lot more involved with and suspicious of Boeing following the MCAS mess.

bumby
0 replies
22h40m

One of the looming risks is that other nations lose faith in the FAA to certify their aircraft. Particularly smaller nations, which, in effect, inherit the FAA certification as safe instead of levying their own.

p_l
0 replies
4h37m

Both major cases of regulatory lack of oversight in USA involved presidential mandate to "deregulate" and "free" the airliner market (DC-8 cargo door failure history, and 737-MAX)

GuB-42
2 replies
23h53m

And, what, undo capitalism?

No, they just have to make following a safety culture less expensive than not. For example, by conducting proper audits. If not following safety requirements means that new planes are not certified and the others get grounded before it is fixed, then it is going to get more costly for Boeing than doing it right to begin with.

That's what regulations are for.

And undermining quality is often not profitable. That's because their customers also want to maximize their profits, and a bad plane, one that doesn't last, requires frequent repairs, is unreliable, has a bad reputation with passengers, etc... isn't going to be very valuable. Customers will pay more for a good plane that offers better returns on investment. This is the same for any B2B company. Consumers are a bit easier to fool, especially with good advertising (which is also expensive), but at some point, they too will realize that a brand is worthless.

calf
0 replies
22h51m

This is reducing culture to money, which I imagine the safety culture theorists anticipated a layperson, misinformed understanding of it.

MomoXenosaga
0 replies
21h38m

Short term profits. Literally nobody gives a shit anymore what happens to a company ten years in the future.

Outsourcing and building the Max fast led to good numbers at the annual shareholder meeting. Arguably it still does because what is anyone going to do? Buy Airbus? They have waiting lists too.

iskander
0 replies
23h59m

Exceptions so far are Novo Nordisk and CostCo. Not sure if there are many others at scale.

hodgesrm
0 replies
23h26m

And, what, undo capitalism?

No, just make it very costly to have quality lapses. Capitalism takes care of the rest. When it's effective government regulation makes companies pay for costs that would otherwise be externalized.

bbor
0 replies
20h42m

Undo American capitalism :). A true capitalism would have strong regulations to prevent this sort of thing, and companies that recognize that making bad products is bad for themselves and society in the long run.

That said, I hope to god you’re a socialist lol. The stance “capitalism inevitably leads to corner cutting, but it’s still the best we’ve got” would have the potential to literally break my mind with consternation.

akira2501
0 replies
23h16m

Well, how about, just enforce laws already passed by congress? Monopolies are illegal. They have been for 100 years and it has yet to "undo capitalism."

Zigurd
0 replies
1d1h

Capitalism in practice is an artificial environment. People speak of it as if it is a force of nature, but anywhere it is put into practice it is put into practice in the context of norms and regulations. Undo capitalism is a conversation terminating tactic.

If the Jack Welch style of capitalism is failing, it can be changed. For example, there is a national Labor relations board because we don't do this anarchically.

bbor
4 replies
20h45m

Does anyone else share my wish that the result of this investigation was “poof no more Boeing”? I don’t understand why corporations can be fundamentally flawed and keep going, where a person in that situation would be prosecuted as a criminal. If Boeing has a bad safety culture because they keep investing unbelievable sums of money into stock buybacks and dividends, so much so that they don’t even have reporting culture… I don’t think they deserve a second chance, and frankly I think the shareholders deserve jail time so I really don’t care if they lose some money.

Yes, I know some pension fund somewhere is invested in Boeing. No, I don’t care. Will we ever solve corruption and climate change if we refuse to actually change our ways?

falserum
3 replies
19h12m

No, we can not solve corruption, because people are greedyand organization needs hierarchy.

Regarding climate change I have hope, but again, same greed, kind of would dictate that at best we will slow it down.

Whatever you will decide to do with boeing, you will have to make employees, shareholders and numerous clients (incl. Us military) content.

Btw. I own a share of a fund which has shares of boeing. Should I go to jail?

bbor
2 replies
15h55m

  people are greedy
I think that people are far more culturally and historically specific than they appreciate, so I take claims like this (i.e. non-specific ones about human nature and virtue therein) with a massive grain of salt. I agree in the general sense of the word, of course!

  Whatever you will decide to do with Boeing, you will have to make employees, shareholders and numerous clients (incl. Us military) content.
I totally agree with many of your points re:climate change and hierarchies, but I don't see how that responds to my initial charge: that specific companies that are found systematically guilty of some sort of crime should be forcibly disbanded.

What if many of the smart, motivated Boeing engineers would be more productive in a dynamic marketplace of smaller firms? What if there's a warp drive concept lurking in the mind of an underutilized systems analyst deep in the basements of their valley? Investing all these resources, especially public fiscal ones, into a company that has proven again and again to prioritize suicidally negligent, short term, excessively selfish thinking... well, it seems criminally unjust.

TL;DR_1: I don't need him, he needs me!

  I own a share of a fund which has shares of boeing. Should I go to jail? 
I would separate laborers who have shares as some form of retirement from capitalists who deploy unimaginable sums of money. I know the 1% discourse is tired but the general sentiment is extremely valid: a relatively small group of powerful people pressured the Boeing board to make these decisions. In the paraphrased words of AOC: "..and it's, like, twelve people."

Yes, I think the people who lobbied for cost cutting and dividend/buyback programs within the company deserve to be criminally investigated. I am so far from a lawyer and doubt our exact current laws and policies (esp. SEC) would be enough, so the most specific I can get is "charges related to negligence and greed" TBH.

But no, I was being unclear when I said "owners" -- not all owners of any amount of the stock are complicit, other than in a broad ethical-consumerism sense. You're on Hacker News, so I have no doubt at all that you're living your life in good faith.

TL;DR_2: capitalists != investors

mlrtime
0 replies
4h59m

As soon as you quote AOC "Eat The Rich" you lost all credibility in your comment section.

She is the least knowledgeable person to be anywhere close to a Boeing strategy of change.

And, just like "Eat The Rich" is rhetoric, so is "..and it's, like, twelve people." It's not 12, it's anyone making more than $X00,000, wherever X makes her more popular with her base.

falserum
0 replies
7h55m

Most people are only mildly greedy, but that accumulates as a silt in a river, and eventually gives opportunity for more serious greed to manifest in full glory. Corporations, while are not democratic in nature, still get nudged in various direction by all the people around it, not only execs, but (even if differently weighted) also employees, customers, voters. As it is the environment where corporation operates in. Btw. I know it’s a bit of a stretch, but I would call turning a blind eye to minor infractions done by others as manifestation of minor greed. (acting would cost my time/energy without benefit to me)

that specific companies that are found systematically guilty of some sort of crime should be forcibly disbanded.

There are limitations what can be actually done to boeing, even if a lot of people agree that boeing is faulty.

It is not feasible to just nuke it from the orbit. (As in, “there was boeing a minute ago, and now there is vacuum”) For example, somehow supply/services to Us military MUST be kept. Maybe restructuring, maybe some execs investigated, maybe penalty, but military must be supplied. (Not disagreeing with the sentiment regarding accountability per se, but implementation must be compatible with current reality)

You're on Hacker News, so I have no doubt at all that you're living your life in good faith.

Thanks for that, but I would caution you to adjust this heuristic. As I see it, HN is a good filter for tech curiuosity, but it is orthogonal to a lots of things. I’ve read that suicide bombers frequently were engineers.

basseed
2 replies
1d1h

widely held as you read it in one post on HN?

zettabomb
0 replies
1d1h

Widely held by many in the industry, including those working at Boeing.

cameroncf
0 replies
1d

It's been covered for at least the last 5 years by many reputable news orgs. That HN link (you looked at the link right?) includes several refs, and a Google search dozens more.

schainks
0 replies
20h6m

Yes, this video also had a great historical breakdown and context about what's going on: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=URoVKPVDKPU

Everything Wendover Productions makes is so helpful!

hinkley
0 replies
1d2h

Really started when Congress decided they were supporting too many aerospace companies and some asshat got the idea that forcing some of them to merge would be a good idea.

Spreading manufacturing all over the US is also more to do with getting kore congressional districts “pregnant” than with national defense. In war you want multiple, as in redundant, supply lines so if one is cut, you can source matériel from somewhere else. What we have is multiple, as in single point of failure, supply lines. Lose one and everything collapses.

TheCondor
0 replies
1d2h

Confirms some serious issues in culture.

Not sure if confirms the cause of those issues or where/when the infection took hold.

hef19898
10 replies
1d3h

In aerospace, saftey actually is the business model so?

WarOnPrivacy
7 replies
1d3h

In aerospace, saftey actually is the business model so?

I should have inc the relevant quote(fixd). Anyway, that was my understanding. But in my linked article, Boeing's CEO corrects me:

"We don’t ‘sell’ safety; that’s not our business model."

This is his day job after all.

hef19898
3 replies
1d3h

Well, seems he was somewhat mistaken after all, wasn't he?

WarOnPrivacy
2 replies
1d2h

Where was he mistaken? He knew his job, did it to completion and was very well rewarded the entire time.

His work at Boeing is so well regarded that investors couldn't wait to firehose capital his way.

ref:https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/forme...

Boeing's CEO is what success looks like.

hef19898
1 replies
1d1h

And yet Boeing became the posterchild, and but of jokes, for really bad engineering. And sold products that killed a couple of hundred people... Truely long term success for the company.

WarOnPrivacy
0 replies
11h41m

And sold products that killed a couple of hundred people... Truely long term success for the company.

That sort of long term outcome is fairly irrelevant to the people in control. Short term profits are what matter. Burn and bail.

After enough years of profit-taking by burning thru hard-built assets - you have the only long term success that matters (to the people with control).

foolswisdom
1 replies
1d3h

Is it not "a" business model, or not Boeing's business model? The latter is exactly what the FAA is saying :-).

WarOnPrivacy
0 replies
1d2h

Is it not "a" business model, or not Boeing's business model? The latter is exactly what the FAA is saying

The FAA doesn't seem to take any notice of Boeing's business model.

marcosdumay
0 replies
1d1h

And that's completely out of line with the general picture on aviation.

The fact that Boeing doesn't think it's their business doesn't mean that nobody thinks it's their business.

SAI_Peregrinus
1 replies
1d3h

No, safety is part of the marketing. If people think the planes are safe, then they'll fly on them & customers (airlines) will buy them. If people think they're not safe, then they won't fly on them and airlines won't want to buy them. If someone is actually injured then there's liability, but that's usually a tiny drop in the bucket compared to the potential marketing effects of safety incidents.

To Boeing, planes need to be safe enough to not cause airlines to cancel orders or result in excessive fines from the government. Any additional safety is waste. The optimal number of people killed is higher than 0 when trying to maximize profits.

As Mike Rowe says, "Safety Third"[1]. The need to make money is first, then willingness to assume risk, and finally safety.

[1] https://mikerowe.com/2022/03/the-origin-of-safety-third/

hef19898
0 replies
1d1h

Thanks for providing a glimps at why those Boeing fuck-ups happened... Safety third, are ypu kidding me? I just hope you don't work on stuff that can kill people...

atoav
0 replies
1d3h

Yeah it isn't. If you are a monopolist. If you are not a lack of safety culture is a gift to your competition: https://www.euronews.com/business/2024/01/10/airbus-shares-s...

That being said, I think the purchase of several commercial aircraft liners (and the pilot/crew training to go with it) is more than anything a true long term commitment. Safety is one thing, reliability is another. Boeings shtick always was to go for old and tested technology. That had some appeal. But nowadays you can't help but feel that Airbus went with the times and evolved what planes are while Boeing forgot how to do them.

GiorgioG
8 replies
1d4h

Maybe if companies stopped kneeling before the almighty alter of the shareholder, they might actually care what happens beyond the next quarter.

markus_zhang
2 replies
1d3h

That's the whole point of Capitalism.

Zigurd
0 replies
18h30m

The stock market used to be a pretty dull place. Now it is a bit too interesting.

GiorgioG
0 replies
1d3h

The stock market is not a requirement of capitalism. Nor is it a requirement for management to be beholden to shareholders in the short term. It's a culture problem. Apple for example, gives two shits about shareholder short/medium term concerns about sinking billions into the Apple Car and Apple Vision Pro that may take a very very long time to become profitable (if ever.)

Tabular-Iceberg
2 replies
1d3h

Why would the shareholders want to risk turning the company into a smoking hole in the ground and making their shares worthless?

That said I think it’s a bit suspicious when so much of the ownership is institutional investors who seem to just own each other, and appear to work against the very interest of maintaining and growing the value of the investment, which is what one would think being a shareholder is all about.

lenerdenator
0 replies
1d3h

There are plenty of ways to make shareholder value without actually improving Boeing's product safety culture. Even if the planes are deathtraps, what are customers going to do about it? Sue? Lawsuits will take years. Buy Airbus planes? Order queue's backed up for years. Ground their fleets? Then they can't make money. Every solution takes years while shareholders have to worry about the next 90 days. Even those with a long position can just propose that the company start selling off assets in order to make up the losses. That's what corporate raiders do, and it's what happened to GE.

Shareholders do not care about companies. They care about making money.

ceejayoz
0 replies
1d3h

Why would the shareholders want to risk turning the company into a smoking hole in the ground and making their shares worthless?

Because they're getting out long before the stock craters.

oldgradstudent
1 replies
1d2h

It has little to do with "shareholder value".

The original sin is paying executives with stocks and especially stock options. It creates catastrophic and corrupting incentive structure.

Their incentive is to raise the stock price long enough to sell some amount of stock options. The company be damned.

There are many examples, but the classic one is Dick Fuld, the CEO of Lehman Brothers. He drove Lehman Brothers into Bankruptcy all while becoming dynastically rich.

dghlsakjg
0 replies
1d2h

Stock compensation for execs should have much longer timelines. You should have to hold the bag for a minimum of 18+ months after you depart, although 5 years would be better.

dathinab
4 replies
1d3h

The panel expressed concern that the confusion might discourage employees from reporting what they see as safety problems.

so who is opening bets that this was at least partially intentional?

Quite often when there are overly complicated reporting pipelines and people not knowing how to use them is because the company doesn't want you to report because that leaves a paper trail which could screw them over if they ignore it and something goes wrong.

hinkley
3 replies
1d1h

Dieselgate is an example of what happens when managers are rewarded for achieving goals they haven’t been given the resources to achieve. When you promote people for achieving the impossible without investigating how they achieved it, that’s how you end up with superfund sites, pollution, or giant safety recalls.

They didn’t do what you asked. They found a way to cheat. And worse, their coworkers and reports know what they did, and see them getting rewarded. The “morally flexible” copy, and the boy scouts leave, or burn out.

hef19898
2 replies
22h55m

Dieselgate started as far up the top of VWs fod chain as you can get: the CEO handpicked and protected by the god father himself, Ferdinand Piech. Well possible that Piech was involved in all of that as well. It started as a deliberate decision to limit AdBlue tank volume to safe money, and extend AdBlue usage to the point drivers didn't have to replenish themselves between inspections, which allowed VW to make more money on service.

That cheating was not engineers cutting corners to please management, it was engineers at the very top of management deliberately ordering the organization to cheat.

hinkley
1 replies
19h26m

I think you have a different story.

The TDIs involved with Dieselgate shipped with no adBlue tank. VW claimed to have some special process where they could catalyze the soot without the nitrogen supply to manage it. But that was all a lie.

Adblue (the accepted solution) wasn't added until 2014 at the earliest. The naughtiest thing they did was that the vehicles detected if they were being run in inspection mode, and adjusted the fuel mixture to avoid exceeding particulate emissions. They may also not have been telling people to refill the tanks on cars that had them, but actively circumventing EEA/EPA compliance checks was what infuriated governments.

hef19898
0 replies
12h10m

The engines had AdBlue, tuey reduced AdBlue in the mix when not in inspection mode. Without AdBlue, there was no way to ever meet emission requirements.

ardaoweo
3 replies
1d3h

This is the real problem with Boeing. The MCAS design fiasco and the door plug falling off were not isolated incidents, but symptoms of broader issues. I can only wonder what remaining hidden flaws aircraft currently in the air may have, and what they might cause in the future. Recently I had the option to fly on either 737MAX or 20 year old A319, and chose the latter option simply because I have more faith in safety culture at Airbus.

hef19898
2 replies
1d3h

If the Aircraft is 20 years old, you should worry a lot more about the airline's safety culture than the manufacturer's. Just saying.

ardaoweo
0 replies
23h38m

As long as maintenance is done properly there's nothing wrong with old aircraft, there are very well defined maintenance programs that specify which parts should be checked / changed and when. The airline in question is among the oldest in EU, and has an excellent safety record.

schainks
2 replies
20h17m

The leaders of Boeing are clearly fumbling the ball, paying themselves more than ever, shitting on their labor and supply chain sub-contractors, all while costing ME as a taxpayer and occasional user more money and stress than ever.

Such a small group of leaders extracting maximum value for themselves at both the cost of the company, greater economy, AND the US Taxpayer sounds, I don't know... criminal?

letsdothisagain
0 replies
19h55m

It's not new either. Teddy Roosevelt ran on trust busting and defeated both the dems and republicans.

euroderf
0 replies
12h11m

But in the absence of criminal enforcement, it just sounds... clubby.

Welcome to Techno-Neo-Feudalism. Your superiors are handling their own compensation quite nicely, thank you. Now get back to work !!

redRabbit99
2 replies
1d3h

China was able to create brand new planes in 2020, they’re not air maxes but smaller units. I believe their new value and sale has undercut the Boeing market, and significantly so, in a way that basically undermines the maintenance value of Boeing.

hef19898
1 replies
1d3h

Besides Chinese airliners having nothing to do with Boeings, or Airbus, marketshare, what is "maintenance value"?

redRabbit99
0 replies
1d3h

Lol why you say that nothing to do with their market share.

Boeings were grounded in China; while china isn’t the only market imagine decreasing a lion share of value from the largest population country? sure it won’t hit hard but it can hit enough to topple something… and seemingly it slightly has.

https://www.cnbc.com/amp/2024/01/24/boeing-delivers-737-max-...

And its just that, the maintenance value I mean literally a dent like that in business trickles down to the bottom, that Chinese market share loss potentially is felt by the engineers and maintenance workers, not the CEOs, etc.

bux93
2 replies
1d4h

It's not that Boeing doesn't have any safety policies or procedures, it's just that no-one is aware of them, so nothing gets reported or fixed? Those findings are worse than you'd expect.. Wonder what it's like over at Airbus and Embraer.

icegreentea2
0 replies
1d1h

It's not that no-one is aware of them.

I read at least two different sets of problems in this report. But first, some background. In the following paragraphs you can substitute "safety" with "quality" in every instance to get equivalent statements that might be more analogous to your experiences.

There is big letter "Safety Culture". This is what happens when you study emergent behavior that you want to replicate, and try to systematize it as much as possible. For excample - as noted in the report, "Safety Culture" consists of 5 pillars - this categorization is purely the result of research and analysis and post-hoc reasoning. The point of "Safety Culture" is that we noticed some organizations that have (little letters) "safety cultures" or "cultures of safety" which were able to achieve long-term excellence in terms of safety, and decided to study their common elements. A company "implements" a big letter "Safety Culture" in hopes of inoculating and maintaining an actual "safety culture".

A Safety Management System is a tool used to achieve and maintain the Safety Culture. For those not sure of what "X management system" means - it's basically a stack of documentation that defines a meta-process and processes that all of your other processes need to conform to, and by doing so, your employees will be forced into "doing the right thing", and aligning their actions and outputs with the goals of Safety Culture, and therefore eventually getting you an actual culture of safety.

In the worst case when you fail at actually sustaining a real safety culture, an SMS then becomes a tool to enforce a minimal standard of safety, from even the most apathetic employee. This comes at enourmous cost of course. Anyone who has had to wait for 3 different authorizations to get a replacement computer at work has witnessed an analogous situation.

Another point that's relevant is that the "Safety Culture" model that Boeing (and ICAO) is referencing is acutally quite young compared to Boeing's overall age. The Safety Culture references in the report are from 1997. The first edition of the ICAO Safety Management manual is from 2006. Boeing has been building safe plans for decades before these "new fangled" capital letter things have even existed. It's absolutely possible for an organization to build safe product without formalized adherence to the formalized "Safety Culture".

Back to problems identified in the report:

The first is that Boeing rolled out a new Safety Management System (SMS) in the last 5-8 years, along with adopting "Safety Culture" policies. But they seem to have blotched the roll out. The report notes that Boeing has its legacy policies and processes for dealing with safety, and those continue in parallel to the new policies and procedures defined in their SMS. They also noted that employees were skeptical of the sustainability of the SMS - ie, they were not sure if this was just some management fad. Many of the findings about "lack of knowledge" read exactly as I'd expect from someone who apathetically clicked through an online training module because they assumed it was useless fluff, because all the real work they've ever seen was handled through legacy processes. Note that a blotched roll out is not the predestined result, even in an environment which was previously lacking a real safety culture, or even middling management.

This is a problem, but could maybe be tolerable (from the perspective of short-term safety), except for the fact that it seemed that that legacy backbone has been rotting away in terms of its effectiveness. The dual system surely isn't helping with its effectiveness.

In other words, while this report focuses on Boeing's failure to achieve "big letter" Safety Culture, reading between the lines also implies a general lack of actual safety culture, and a lack of competent change management.

atoav
0 replies
1d3h

As far as I know they have a very strict safety culture at Airbus. Living in Hamburg, close to their location there, made a factory tour once and met multiple employees during the years and had chats with them about general ways how things are done at the place.

But a few chats with employees and a factory tour isn't the most reliable source to judge this.

burnerburnson
2 replies
1d2h

The average engineer at Boeing makes $120k/year. That's about $50k less than what a new grad with no experience will get from big tech.

Boeing doesn't have a culture problem, they have an idiot problem. The idea that you can hire competent engineers offering salaries like that is absurd.

They need to adopt a pay for performance mentality and bring in managers who are not afraid to fire underperformers.

kghe3X
1 replies
1d1h

Just where is an inexperienced new grad making $170k out of the gate? I find this difficult to believe. Are you normalizing for cost of living? I suspect, most Boeing employees aren't based in the Valley.

StevenXC
0 replies
1d

A major Boeing campus is in Huntsville, AL, which is going to affect that average for sure.

AnarchismIsCool
2 replies
23h46m

Something that helps a lot: have a safety incident team with absolutely no connection to HR. They have no ability to fire anyone or report on your performance review, they don't talk to managers about people and just record and compile safety related issues. Yeah, you may have an employee or two who screams wolf a lot, but their job is just to investigate, fix the specific issue, anonymize, and aggregate the reports. This lack of connection should be very public so everyone feels comfortable talking to them.

This is part of how the FAA vastly reduced the fatality rate in GA. They stopped playing cop and started playing engineer.

kmonad
1 replies
23h39m

I like the idea, but I am pessimistic. The more experienced I get (aka getting older), the more I see administrative bloating as the cancer of institutions---a somewhat equally inescapable fate. Installing a safety reporting administration may do what it set out to do, initially. But at some point, promotions may be handed out to those with most reports, perhaps perverting the initial intent.

In another thread I read that the EASA and FAA used to send Airbus/EASA engineers to Boeing (and maybe vice versa) who could raise all sorts of hell if mistakes were found. Such a setup seems perhaps harder to "game". I do not know this for a fact, I recall it from reading another debate, so take it as hearsay.

euroderf
0 replies
11h55m

These sound like variations on "tiger teams". And they sound appropriate.

neilv
1 replies
21h48m

If company leadership recklessly eroded safety practices, of a well-understood safety-critical national institution... is there individual criminal liability?

Prosecuting willful bad behavior at the top that led to deaths might help push the culture back.

WheatMillington
0 replies
21h39m

I don't know the situation in the USA, but it would appear there is virtually never indivdiual liability. Here in New Zealand there is absolutely personal director and executive responsibility and accountability where it comes to safety.

dboreham
1 replies
1d4h

The KPIs are all good though.

jeffrallen
0 replies
1d1h

Except "number of days since last door fell off" which is trending a bit lower than we'd like to see. And "number of days since last damning report from our regulator saying our safety culture is totally messed up" which is (checks notes) 1 day.

mvkel
0 replies
1d2h

A great example of what will happen when the libertarian mindset takes hold of any industry.

The risk/reward among market forces is entirely different; many lives lost become "the cost of doing business" despite being entirely preventable.

michaelcampbell
0 replies
1d2h

Safety culture is too hard for the MBA's to put a dollar value on, until it's too late.

Having worked in the (network) Security domain for some time, the same thing there. When things are going well, "what do we pay you for?", and when they turn catastrophic, "what do we pay you for?"

iancmceachern
0 replies
1d1h

They sold their soul to make the people at the top rich.

It's not about airplanes, it's about human nature.

heisenbit
0 replies
20h38m

Reading Admiral Cloudberg‘s latest https://admiralcloudberg.medium.com/the-fall-of-the-viscount... history on deicing of air inlets and that these systems are now automatic and the 737 system was grandfathered in was interesting: „(The Boeing 737 is of course the one big exception, because its 1960s-era crew-activated engine anti-ice system has been repeatedly grandfathered in with no automatic mode for the last half century.) „

Did not Boeing ask for an exemption recently due to a dangerous heat up situation if these heaters were not turned off in time?

dogman144
0 replies
1d

I knew a Boeing swe, and several years back the QA approach with code sounded hugely disconcerting considering big picture controlled an airplane - variables named “A, B, C,” variable reuse, shell staffing/multi-hats on their desk due to retention issues, on and on.

aydyn
0 replies
20h31m

I know this is beating a dead horse at this point, but the "key element" missing is not safety culture, it's accountability: people need to start facing real jail time for all the deaths they've caused.

None of this distributed blame horseshit.

Downstream will fall in place once the correct incentives are in place.

andruby
0 replies
23h14m

The stock market doesn’t seem to care about this report. Unless it was already rumored a while ago and priced in.

BA (Boeing’s stock ticker) has been trading sideways this week.